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I was standing in line at the local grocery store, waiting for my
regular checker In front of me were two guys, purchasing beer and
snack items. Slightly bored, I listened absently to their conversa-
tion as I scanned the tabloid headlines. My boredom vanished,
however, when I realized that they were "hitting on" Mary' ask-
ing if she were available that evening after work to share beer,
snacks and good times. I found myself staring open-mouthed since
it was easy to see her wedding band, and I could discern no be-
havior of hers that would have invited these comments. Mary
smiled tightly while ringing up the sale, and politely declined their
offer When my turn came, I incredulously asked her how often
this kind of thing happens, and how she deals with it. She replied
Professor, University of Washington School of Law. A.B., 1975, Princeton; J.D.,
1978, Michigan. The Washington Law Foundation provided financial support for
this project.
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adhere to that policy. Author Lea Vaughn provides citation at the end of a paragraph,
containing multiple sentences with quoted material, where the cites would be identi-
cal throughout the paragraph. Such a format limits redundancy without sacrificing
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that it happened with some regularity, that the store would back
her up for egregious cases, but that she was supposed to be polite to
customers. Ending, she commented, you get used to it."
"It" is sexual harassment. But the source of this harassment is not
supervisors or coworkers, but customers, clients and other third parties
not directly controlled by the employer. While the literature on supervi-
sor and co-worker harassment is voluminous, very little has been written
about third party sexual harassment2 in the academic literature.' Nor
have there been many cases tried in the courts.
Despite scarce legal documentation of this phenomenon, other
sources suggest that third party harassment is common Because it has
not been addressed legally, there exists a gap between the experience of
third party harassment and an ability to do much, be it legal or non-
legal, about the results of the experience. In some sense, recognizing
third party sexual harassment is a third wave of sexual harassment litiga-
2. Throughout this paper the term "third party sexual harassment" will be used to refer
to sexual harassment perpetrated by customers, clients, patrons, vendors, independent
contractors, patients and others with whom the employees of a business or service
have a contract or other relationship. This listing does not exhaust the possibilities of
third party contacts, but is only to serve as an example of the types of parties impli-
cated by this article.
3. See Joseph G. Allegretti, Sexual Harassment by Nonemployees: The Limits of Employer
Liability, 9 EMP. REL. L.J. 98 (1983); Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual
Harassment by Clients, Customers, and Suppliers, How Employers Should Handle An
Emerging Legal Problem, 20 EMP. REL. L.J. 85 (1994) [hereinafter Aalberts & Seid-
man, Clients]; Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of
Employees by Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable?, 21 PEPP. L.
REv. 447 (1994) [hereinafter Aalberts & Seidman, Non-Employees]; Peter Jan
Honigsberg et al., When the Client Harasses the Attorney-Recognizing Third-Party
Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession, 28 U.S.F.L. REv. 715 (1994); Amy
Mathews, The Sexual Harassment Revolution: Employer Liability for Third Party Sexual
Harassment, 65 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 977 (1997). See also BARBARA LINDEMANN &
DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 248-53 (1992).
4. See the text below accompanying the notes. While there have been few cases, it has
been suggested that it might be the next tide of sexual harassment litigation. See, e.g.,
Mark Hansen, The Next Litigation Frontier?: Claims Against Employers for Third-Party
Harassment on the Rise, 79 A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1993), at 26 (demonstrating that all of the
people interviewed in the article noted a rise in claims or inquiries about third party
harassment); Kathleen Murray, Fighting Sexual Harassment Goes Beyond Co-Workers,
to Clients, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at H2. But cf, Amy Stevens, Women Lawyers
Harassed by Clients, Too, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1994, at B1 ("[A]bout a dozen legal
experts said they know of no court decisions involving client sexual harassment,
....1).
5. See infra Part I.
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tion and scholarship.6 Additionally, recognizing third party sexual har-
assment, as well as developing a comprehensive theory of harassment
that makes it unacceptable on any basis,7 is an important step in con-
structing workplaces imbued with dignity and respect for all workers.
This article will ask a series of questions. What is third party sexual
harassment? Under what conditions does it occur? Does it differ in any
significant respects from traditional notions of sexual harassment?
Should those differences, if any, make a difference in the way that the
legal system addresses third party harassment? And indeed, should the
problem be addressed solely through the legal system? What might an
employer do to alleviate sexual harassment of this type?
The thesis of this article is that third party sexual harassment is a
prevalent form of harassment that the legal system does not currently
nor energetically pursue. At a time of breathtaking workplace change, it
is just one more destabilizing, and sometimes traumatizing, obstacle for
6. In this analogy, the first wave of sexual harassment would be the recognition of sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination. That the doctrine was even developed is
due in large part to the efforts of Catharine A. MacKinnon. See generally CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). Two early
cases in which the doctrine was recognized are Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990
(D.C. Cir. 1977) and Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976).
Early cases focused on what is now called quid pro quo harassment, that is, the direct
and unwilling exchange of sexual favors for tangible job benefits. The second wave
would be the recognition and development of the doctrine of hostile environment
sexual harassment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) represents the
latest definitive doctrinal pronouncement about this doctrine. Both the first and sec-
ond wave have focused exclusively on sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisors
and co-workers. Thus, the courts have grappled with a definition of actionable sexual
harassment, and with the contours of employer liability for the acts of their employ-
ees. Here, however, the focus will be both on describing a third form of sexual
harassment and on suggesting potential consequences for employers. In the last two
or three years a "third wave" of scholarship has begun to emerge regarding even con-
ventional sexual harassment. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of
Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. Rav. 1169 (1998); Kathryn Abrams, Postscript,
Spring 1998: A Response to Professors Bernstein and Franke, 83 CORNELL L. Rav. 1257
(1998); Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83 CORNELL L.
Rav. 1231 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A
Reply to Professor Abrams, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1245 (1998); Vicki Schultz, Reconcep-
tualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998); Richard L. Wiener &
Barbara A. Gutek, Advances in Sexual Harassment Research, Theory, and Policy, 5 Psy-
CHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 507 (1999) (introducing a series of articles with new research
findings).
7. Traditional legal scholarship tends to divide off sexual harassment from harassment
based on age, religion, race and national origin. It is not clear whether this has been a
salutary development, but exploration of this notion is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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women and their advancement in the workplace. Exposing third party
sexual harassment for what it is will act as a catalyst for more vigorous
action, both of a legal and non-legal nature, to eradicate it from the
workplace. To that end, the conclusion of this Article will pose some
suggestions about remedies that affected victims could pursue.
Part I of this article will explore the prevalence of third party
harassment, drawing on evidence from a number of different types of
workplaces. The purpose of this section is to establish the reality and
consequences of third party sexual harassment." In Part II, the response
8. This part of the article will include both narrative stories of the type encouraged by
feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory, and research from non-legal disci-
plines. The purpose of such an approach is to give a fuller account of the problem.
Using purely legal analysis can obscure issues and their persistence despite traditional
legal interventions. Consider the following analysis from a review of three books, two
written by law professors, and the third by an interdisciplinary scholar: "
Can they really be talking about America in 1996? Granted, crude "racism"
and "sexism"-words that imply malicious intent-have abated since the
1960s and are now in many places taboo. But surely racial and sexual
bias-institutional or unconscious attitudes and practices that nonetheless
harm women and minorities-still exist everywhere about us. Eastland's
and Kahlenberg's myopia on this point stems not, I believe, from their
status as white men-that's too pat and deterministic an explanation for
my tastes-but rather from their narrow method of inquiry. Both men are
legal scholars, and both view affirmative action mainly in legal terms. With
Jim Crow toppled and dozens of anti-discrimination statutes on the books,
they (correctly) see most codified forms of discrimination as dead. End of
story.
Bergmann, in contrast, draws on a wide range of disciplines to paint a
much more nuanced and recognizable picture of, in the words of one chap-
ter title, "How Exclusion Occurs." Where Eastland and Kahlenberg sound
eerily aloof from the real world perdurability of discrimination, Bergmann
is keenly sensitive to human psychology and the ways that prejudice, like a
mutating virus that steels itself against new antibodies, endures even amid
laws forbidding overt racism and sexism. She marshals an imposing slew of
studies from labor economists, sociologists and psychologists to show that
racial bias is not only alive but kicking, and that those brutal kicks are still
crippling women and minorities.
David Greenberg, Affirmative Action in the Positive and Negative, WASH. POST
NAT'L WEKLY ED., July 8-14, 1996, at 32. To some extent, this article, as well as
the just cited book review, raise the perennial law and morals/attitudes debate. To the
extent that this issue is raised, the author believes that law can and does change atti-
tudes and beliefs as it changes behaviors. This material is cited to illuminate that in
certain cases, traditional doctrinal analysis alone is insufficient to describe and remedy
social problems. Thus, it is not necessarily that critical race theory or traditional doc-
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of the legal system to third party sexual harassment will be detailed,
beginning with a brief overview of basic sexual harassment doctrine.
Part III, on the other hand, will look at the assessment of third party
harassment from the point of view of business, and the literature on the
role of sexuality in the workplace which forms the basis of an
interdisciplinary account of sexual harassment. Suggested directions for
the legal doctrine in this area and options for eliminating this form of
behavior in the workplace will be suggested. Last, this article will suggest
that harassment in any form will not abate until a comprehensive
approach to employee dignity is adopted, in which any form of
harassment on any basis is deemed inappropriate and illegal.9
I. THE PREVALENCE OF THIRD PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Reports of sexual harassment are legion. The occurrence of sexual
harassment is well documented, and it has become a part of our cultural
landscape. Every gender study of the court system includes data and
narrative about the incidence of sexual harassment. Although we know
it occurs frequently, we do not always know what it is.
The definition of sexual harassment is drawn from two sources: the
landmark Supreme Court case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson"° and
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
guidelines on Sexual Harassment.' Summarized, these sources suggest
the following hallmarks of sexual harassment:
1. Unwelcome conduct which
2. Either affects a tangible job benefit, or renders the work
environment "hostile."
And, typically, the references assume that the sexual harassment has
been committed by a co-worker or by a supervisor.
Third party harassment, in its constituent parts, parrots the stan-
dard definition of sexual harassment. What sets it apart from the typical
scenario is the perpetrator. In these cases, the sexual harassment is
committed by third parties not directly under the control of the victim's
trinal analysis is better, but that they are both valuable methodologies for inquiring
into any number of social problems.
9. One author recently began this ambitious task. See, David C. Yamada, The Phenon-
menon of'Workplace Bullying'and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment
Protection, 88 GEo.L.J. 475 (2000).
10. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2001).
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employer. The social questions in these cases center around the fre-
quency of this conduct, and our changing social mores in its regard. Not
surprisingly, the legal questions revolve around the ability of the victim
to hold her employer liable for this conduct. It is one thing to hold an
employer liable for those people whom it directly controls; it is quite
another to suggest that employers should be roving enforcement officers
for sexual behavior at the workplace. This view recognizes that third
party sexual harassment, like any other form, is about power as well as
sex.'" The customer or client leverages the power implied in the phrase,
"The customer is always right," to engage in harassing behavior that
goes far beyond the acceptable customer/client interaction. This view
also recognizes that heightening the legal duties of one's employer may
empower potential victims as well as deter the behavior of perpetrators."
The purpose of this section is to describe the types of third party
sexual harassment that occur in a number of professions and jobs. Ob-
viously, this survey cannot purport to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, the
examples below should suffice to prove that third party sexual harass-
ment does exist, and that it exists across a wide spectrum of occupations.
Second, these examples will demonstrate the ways in which third party
harassment is as damaging as supervisor or co-worker sexual harassment.
A. Lawyers
Neither the status nor assertive image of lawyers have protected
women attorneys from client harassment. As early as 1989, female at-
torneys reported sexual harassment from clients." In a more recent
12. Some argue that sexual harassment is only about power. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra
note 6. On the other hand, some authorities argue that sexual harassment does have a
sexual component. See, e.g., BARBARA GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 13 (1985).
In some ways this is a chicken and egg argument, and the bottom line still remains,
under either theory, that sexual harassment is offensive and can profoundly interfere
with the ability of its victims to work to their full potential.
13. One could argue that the type of legal regime suggested here is paternalistic and a
throw-back to women's protective legislation. The response is that this legal regime
furthers the ability of women to work safely, and to the full extent of their abilities,
rather than artificially hindering the development of talents and ambitions. In any
event, the hostile environment approach to sexual harassment provides a solid ana-
lytical basis for asserting that an employer has certain legally enforceable duties
concerning the quality of its employees' work environment.
14. Alan Deutschman & Sara Hammes, Dealing with Sexual Harassment, FORTUNE, Nov.
4, 1991 at 145 (citing Thom Weidlich & Charise K. Lawrence, Sex and the Firms: A
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survey, 61.5% of the 553 women litigators surveyed reported being
sexually harassed by clients in the last five years. 15 Although as a profes-
sion we have studied ourselves closely with regard to gender bias, most
of the studies have focused on sexual harassment in its traditional sense
or on other gender bias issues. 16 Nonetheless, the incidents do occur.
In a recent article, a partner at a New York law firm reported being
kissed and asked to accompany a client to his hotel room after a business
dinner. Additionally, an associate described an incident in which a cli-
ent, while looking her straight in the eye, said, "I think I'm in love." 7
These incidents increasingly involve "virtual" encounters. A series
of postings on the FEMJUR list serv included a discussion of electronic
sexual harassment. Responding to an article in the Wall Street Journal,
the first posting in this discussion described a very graphic and sexually
explicit voice mail message that was apparently being passed among the
phone systems of male lawyers and investment bankers. When becom-
ing aware of this message, the writer commented:
[T]his ... [sends] a message to the female attorneys that they
do not belong in their boys' club. [T]he existence of this mes-
sage leaves female attorneys at these firms, . . . in a catch-22.
[TIhey either complain about the message, and be viewed as a
Progress Report, NAT'L LAW J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 1). In the "survey of 900 female at-
torneys, 10% said that clients exerted unwanted pressure for dates, 9% complained of
touching, cornering, or pinching, and 4% cited pressure for sex, sometimes as a pre-
requisite for getting the client's business." Id. at 145, 148.
15. Stevens, supra note 4, at B1, B3. A recent article in the ABA Journal outlines the
continuing prevalence of this behavior. Debra Baker, Plague in the Profession, 86
A.B.A. J. 40 (Sept., 2000).
16. For one of the most recent and publicly available reports, see Report of the Special
Committee on Gender to The D. C Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias,
84 GEO. L.J. 1649 (1996) (including a forward by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
The report states: "Nearly 17% of female respondents said that they had received
unwanted sexual advances from clients." Id. at 1729. Court employees also reported
some instances of sexual harassment from attorneys, jurors and other third parties. Id.
at 1850-1851. See also, e.g., THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE (July,
1993)[hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS REPORT]; Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, The Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts, reprinted
in 24 NEW ENG. L. REv. 745 (1990); WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER
AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS (1989); MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT OF
THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS
(Dec., 1989). Many of the reports detail how women and women's issues are treated
in the courts, but do not focus exclusively on the treatment of women attorneys.
17. Stevens, supra note 4, at B3.
2002]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
prude, or they laugh along with the men, and participate in
their own degradation."
Respondents to the message reported similar incidents. For exam-
ple, a male prosecutor playing a tape of a rape victim's deposition for
"entertainment" purposes. 9 All involved in this discussion suggested
that the best action was to confront the individuals involved in the elec-
tronic dissemination of harassing materials. °
Regardless of the form of behavior, lawyers are reluctant to report it
to their firms or employers.21 Individual lawyers vary in their response to
harassing incidents: some shrug it off, while others report it to their
firm. But this does not mean that the lawyers do not worry about being
reassigned to a different client or case, or that they will lose out on busi-
22
ness opportunities, or worse, be perceived as "weak" and unable to
handle it.
Firm responses to this behavior vary. One article suggests that this
matter is "touchy" because of the law firms' dependence on clients for
its business, and the relationship of rainmaking to lawyer advance-
18. Posting of Rebecca Eisenberg, rebecca@netcom.com, to FEMJUR@Listserv.syr.edu
(June 9, 1995) (on file with the author).
19. Posting of Liz, liz@gate.net, to FEMJUR@listserv.syr.edu (June 9, 1995) (on file
with the author).
20. Posting of Cynthia Barnes, cbarnes@swan.admin.uiuc.edu, to FEMJUR@ listserv.syr.edu
(June 12, 1995) (on file with the author); Liz, supra note 19.
21. Often, and with good reasons, attorneys fear that they will be ostracized by the legal
community. Consider the story of Rebecca Fisher. Her story involved em-
ployer/employee harassment (she alleged that Miami's Capital Banks's founder and
chairman, Abel Holtz, harassed her when she was chief lawyer for the bank). After she
quit her job, allegations about her employer's conduct became public. Since then, all
of her job prospects have disappeared. Marilyn Adams, Her Life on the Line, SEA.
TIMES, August 15, 1993, at L1, L5. The author of the articles goes on to note:
Professional women may have more to gain from a harassment charge than
a waitress or a secretary, but they also have a lot more to lose: Powerful
friends and social contacts. Lucrative business opportunities. Because they
are considered more newsworthy, harassment charges by successful and af-
fluent women are more likely to end up in the headlines, turning a private
matter into a public free-for-all.
Id. at L5. And, of course, the specter of Anita Hill comes instantly to mind.
22. Stevens, supra note 4, at B3.
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ment." A member of another firm states "'[w]e don't use our associates
as bait' to get or keep a client.,
24
While the responses of individual firms have varied, the profession,
through the American Bar Association Commission on Women in the
Profession, has issued a report which includes detailed suggestions for
drafting and implementing sexual harassment policies in law firms. 25
Unlike other issues presented in hearings before the ABA Commission
on Women, the issue of harassment arose out of private communica-
tions and an article published in the ABA Journal. In fact, the genesis
of the topic through this irregular route "led one Commission member
to describe sexual harassment as 'the dirty little secret' of our profes-
sion." 27 The motive for developing this particular report was the
assumption that as the profession grows to include more women, poli-
cies which encourage employee loyalty through an enli htened working
environment will best attract female lawyers to practice.
23. Id. at BI.
24. Karen Sutherland, Associates Are Not Bait: How to Avoid Sexual Harassment by Clients,
KING Co. BAR BULLETIN, Dec. 1995, at 10 (quoting Jim Haney, of Ogden Murphy
Wallace, P.L.L.C.).
25. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, Lawyers And Balanced Lives: A
Guide to Drafting and Implementing Workplace Policies for Lawyers (1990). Local bar
newspapers are also addressing this issue and offering suggestions. See, e.g., Suther-
land, supra note 24.
26. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 25, intro., at 2
(noting Nina Burleigh & Stephanie A. Goldberg, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Har-
assment in Law Firms, A.B.A. J., Aug., 1989, at 46).
27. Id. intro., at 2.
28. Id. intro., at 3-5. Although beyond the scope of this article, two recent articles focus
on the difficult situation of law students in the internship situation and in law firm
interviews. Noting how interns fall between the categories of "student" (Title IX) and
"employee" (Title VII), the first article discusses remedies and approaches to dealing
with harassment occurring during internships. Cynthia Grant Bowman & MaryBeth
Lipp, Legal Limbo of the Student Intern: The Responsibility of Colleges and Universities
to Protect Student Interns Against Sexual Harassment, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 95
(2000). The second article suggests that one approach to regulating sexual harassment
within the law firm would be to extend legal ethics rules to this behavior. Author
DeVincentis proposes the following rule:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF FIRM LAWYERS FOR CIVILITY
IN RECRUITMENT AND PRACTICE
1. A lawyer is required to use general civility in:
(a) recruiting,
(b) hiring,
(c) interviewing, and
(d) in practice with law students and lawyers within a lawyer's firm.
2002]
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Two additional studies also establish the existence of client harass-
ment. The first study documents harassment coming both from the firm
and from the clients.29 Although the focus of this study was on harass-
ment within the firm, it reported that third party harassment does
occur, but that because "more and more [attention is directed] to the
bottom line there is caution about offending a client who engages in
harassment against a woman attorney."30 They found that most women
used interpersonal skills to handle client harassment rather than ask a
male colleague to speak to the client. 1 Regrettably, this part of the re-
port did not link up observations about client harassment with a prior
section on business development." At the outset of that section, the
study authors noted that business development is considered "an area in
which many women, but not all, experience difficulty."" Although they
ascribe this to a number of factors, they also note that many of the social
settings in which business is sought raise questions of "propriety" for
women attorneys.3 ' This suggests that the client situation has multiple
problems for the female attorney, and that client harassment can limit
business opportunities which could lead to partnership.
These observations are corroborated in the second, more detailed
study.35 The purpose of this book was to examine and argue that sex
discrimination in the legal profession is rarely overt, but rather is subtle
and intangible, and that there is evidence that this "intangible" dis-
crimination is "fact, not fiction. The authors use the 1984 and 1990
ABA National Survey of Career Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction to prove
2. A lawyer should not engage in sexual or social misconduct with or toward
another lawyer or law student.
3. A lawyer should not act inappropriately toward another lawyer or law
student.
Amanda DeVincentis, Navigating the Borders: A Proposal for General Civility
Legal Ethics on Sexual Harassment, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 543 (Spring 2000).
29. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors. Women 's Advancement in
the Legal Profession, 64 FoRDHI-I L. Ray. 291 (1995) (reporting empirical data
provided by eight New York corporate firms that allowed their attorneys to be
interviewed).
30. Id. at 377.
31. Id.
32. Id. at331-43.
33. Id. at 331.
34. Id. at 335.
35. BERNARD F. LENTZ & DAVID N. LABAND, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION (1995).
36. Id. at xvi-xvii.
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their thesis. 7 The three middle chapters of the book analyze the data as
it pertains to employer, coworker and client discrimination looking not
only at sexual harassment, but also things such as work assignments and
mentoring.3 The 1990 survey included explicit questions about sexual
harassment by clients, and reveals an observable incidence of attor-
ney/client harassment.3 9 In trying to determine which variables
accounted for the harassment the authors looked at factors such as age,
marital status, work setting, and salary. Finally, they concluded that cli-
ent-based sexual harassment also occurs in solo practice. The author's
data reveals the following pattern of sexual harassment by clients:
37. Id. at 4-5.
38. Id. at75-153.
39. The authors present their findings, reported by percentage responses for each type of
harassment, in Table 6.3 which is reproduced below:
PRIVATE PRACTICE NON-PRIVATE PRACTICE
TYPE OF MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
HARASSMENT
Unwanted
sexual teas-
ing, jokes, 0.126' 0.353 0.058' 0.191
remarks, or
questions
Unwanted
pressure for 0.028' 0.065 0.000 0.011
dates
Unwanted
sexual looks 0.049' 0.190 0.032' 0.096
or gestures
Unwanted
deliberate
touching, 0.016' 0.072 0.011 0.021
leaning over,
or cornering
Other types
of sexual 0.034' 0.078 0.005' 0.074
harassment
statistically significant difference at the 0.01 level
statistically significant difference at the 0.10 level
Id. at 133.
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PERCENT OF WOMEN REPORTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF ANY
TYPE CATEGORIZED BY TYPE OF PRACTICE40
Private Practice 76%
Non-Private Practice 39%
Solo Practice 85%
The source of lawyers' deference to clients is not the aphorism that
frames the title of this article; rather it is grounded in centuries of tradi-
tion 4 and the ethics undergirding the lawyer-client relationship. This
relationship transcends contract law and rests, instead, on fiduciary
principles imbued with trust and confidentiality.42 While economic in-
terests may make the choice between an individual lawyer and firm
profits difficult and conflicting, there is no duty for American lawyers to
43
represent a particular client. Moreover, in the modern firm or corpo-
rate counsel office, a willingness to terminate the lawyer-client
relationship because of inappropriate conduct is confounded by the
status relationships between partners and associates, with male attorneys
dominating the ranks of the former."
40. This chart is based on data from Table 6.3, Id. at 133 and Table 6.9, Id. at 153.
Similarly, the statistics for males are:
Private Practice 25%
Non-Private Practice 10%
Solo Practice 33%
Id. at 133, 153.
41. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146 (1986).
42. Id. at 146-47.
43. Id. at 571-74. There is a limited duty to represent indigent clients or those otherwise
unable to secure counsel, supported by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Rule 6.2) and the ethical codes of various states. Id. at 573-74.
44. Stevens, supra note 4.
In a 1992 survey of the 250 largest firms by the National Law Journal re-
ported that women accounted for 37% of associates and 11% of partners.
The figures were up only slightly from 1989, the previous survey period.
Men also dominate the ranks of corporate law departments-typically the
key contact point for client companies.
Id. at B3. See also NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS RaEPORT, supra note 16, at 1193
(noting the paucity of women in federal practice as creating "two different worlds"
for male and female practitioners).
THE CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS RIGHT
B. Service Industries: Retail Sales and Restaurants
For women in the retail and service sectors, the "customer is always
right" philosophy reigns the strongest.45 Many women in the sales in-
dustry report that customer harassment seems to be part of the job. In
one early account, women reported sexual harassment from customers,
with several estimating that anywhere from 1 percent to 10 percent of
male customers engaged in the behavior.46 The women reported that the
behavior made them angry, and sometimes it made them afraid. More-
over, none of them felt they engaged in behavior or wore clothing that
could have made the harassment expected.47 When questioned as to why
the harassment occurs, most of the women said they thought it involved
power rather than sex: "It says, 'You're lower than I am and I can do
this to you . . . ."' "Men control the world. They control the airways
and the sea lanes, but they can't control themselves if a woman wears a
tight sweater? I just don't buy it.""
This behavior also surfaces in the local chain supermarket. A series
of newspaper articles chronicled the results of a Safeway policy in which
all employees were required to give customers "big smiles." The com-
pany enforced this policy with undercover shoppers resulting in the
remedial placement of about one hundred employees in a "smile
school." Employees report that customers have mistaken the enforced
45. Although this may be a peculiarly American phenomenon. Consider the following:
Since entering the market in Eastern Europe in 1992, Kmart has found
some interesting problems it must find solutions to. In its initial entrance
to the market, the discount retailer purchased 13 stores from the Czecho-
slovakian government's Prior chain for $120 million.
An experienced saleswoman employed by Kmart in Prague removed the
familiar Kmart badge which says "I'm Here For You" because, she said it
offended her and "People can interpret it any way they want; it looks like
I'm here not just for business but for the amusement of certain customers."
While such slogans in the West indicate a concern for the customer, many
believe that particularly in the East, such statements open the door for sex-
ual harassment of the employees by customers. Officials already report that
turning around the concepts of the East into that of the West where the
primary concern of the salespeople must be the customer-is already a dif-
ficult job.
Kmart Faces Problems in Europe, THE WEBB REPORT (A Newsletter of Sexual Har-
assment by Susan L. Webb), August 1994, at 7.
46. Loraine Anderson, Abuse From Another Corner, DETROIT FREE PREss, May 26, 1982,
at 1E-2E.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2E.
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friendliness for flirting, and one reported daily propositions. As a result,
employees in the northern California stores filed grievances protesting
this policy.49
Regrettably, most business literature does not focus on the percep-
tions of employees to policies such as "The Customer is Always Right!"
or "Wear a Smile."50 In service encounters, the business goal is a com-
pletely satisfying experience from the customer's point of view, not the
employee's. One study identified four classes of customer behaviors
which caused them problems for employees: drunkenness, verbal and
physical abuse, breaking company policies or laws, and uncooperative-
ness. The authors conclude that some unsatisfactory service encounters
are due to customers rather than employees: "A primary contribution of
this research effort is the empirically based finding that unsatisfactory
service encounters may be due to inappropriate customer behaviors-
the notion that sometimes customers are wrong."'" The contradiction
between the reality of this finding and the business policies that assume
the opposite causes stress for employees, especially considering that
problem customers were identified as causing 22% of dissatisfactory in-
cidents.52 The authors conclude that management must develop policies
that recognize this reality, either giving employees appropriate training
or putting in place policies that could control customer behavior."
C. Librarians
Female librarians are deplorably depicted as bookish, plain types
whose last concern need be sexual harassment of even the mildest
49. This summary is created from the following articles: Kim Curtis, Safeway Clerks Ob-ject to Smile Rule, Asso. PRESS, Sept. 2, 1998; Tony Kornheiser, Unsafe Way?, WASH.
POST, Sept. 13, 1998, at Fl; Adair Lara, Smile, and the World Gets Peeved, SAN FRAN.
CHRONICLE, Sept. 8, 1998, at C12; Smiles Overboard, SEA. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1998, at
A13.
50. As one article notes, "previous research correlating customer and employee views of
service is sparse .... Mary Jo Bitner et al., Critical Service Encounters: The Employee's
Viewpoint, 58 J. OF MARKETING 95, 96 (Oct. 1994).
51. Id. at 101.
52. Id. at 101-02. The authors go on to note that this percentage may be larger "in in-
dustries in which the customer has greater input into the service delivery process (e.g.,
health care, education, legal services)." Id. at 102.
53. Id. at 102.
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form.54 The reports from the trenches, however, put this stereotype
firmly to rest and illustrate the point that third party sexual harassment
can and does happen anywhere. In 1992, Will Manley asked subscribers
to American Libraries to respond to a questionnaire on isexual harass-
ment in libraries.5 He sent out this survey after an earlier "joke" survey
on "Librarians and Sex"" revealed that 78% of the women responding
54. Lamentably, this stereotype is perpetuated in the legal literature. See Aalberts &
Seidman, Non-Employees, supra note 3, at 471-72. The authors characterize occupa-
tions as high-risk, mid-level risk, and low-risk vis-i-vis the likelihood that sexual
harassment from third parties will occur. This is the authors' attempt to suggest when
employers should be aware of the likelihood of harassment, and what a reasonable
woman might expect in such a workplace. Id. at 464-70. Characterizing a "female
employee in a conventional bookstore" as an employee who is at low risk of sexual
harassment, the authors state:
Here, conservatively dressed in a relatively sophisticated setting, little or no
risk of sexual harassment is expected. The employer in this workplace must
be most protective and respond to even mild provocation. The average rea-
sonable woman would expect nothing less. Indeed, a worker in this kind of
environment should, in all probability, anticipate fewer sexually hostile acts
from customers than what might be expected from a fellow employee in
the workplace.
Id. at 471. The authors have characterized topless female dancers as engaged in a high
risk occupation, and a cocktail waitress in a conventional lounge as a mid-level risk
occupation. Id. at 470-71. My argument is quite the contrary: occupations need not,
and should not, be categorized by levels of risk. Sexual harassment should not be tol-
erated in any occupation. To do otherwise leads, at best, to hair splitting, and at
worst, to the perpetuation of demeaning and harmful stereotypes.
55. Will Manley, Will's World: No Laughing Matter This Month, 24 AMERICAN LIBRARIES
68 (1993). The questionnaire was as follows:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY LIBRARY PATRONS
1. In the past 12 months how often have you been sexually harassed by library
patrons?
__ not at all daily - weekly - monthly
2. Which of the following forms of sexual harassment have you experienced?
__ visual harassment (being stared at, leered at, flashed, etc.)
- physical harassment (being touched, followed, etc.)
__ verbal harassment (being threatened, called demeaning names, exposed to
sexually suggestive language, etc.)
3. Which sentence best describes how you feel about your vulnerability to acts
of sexual assault or physical violence when you are working in your library?
__ I always feel safe and secure.
- I generally feel safe, but sometimes I feel at risk.
I often feel at risk.
I am scared all the time.
56. Will Manley, Facing the Public, WILSON LIBRARY BULLETIN, June 1992, at 65-66.
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had been sexually harassed. Many of their responses included unsolicited
comments about the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct. Two
other events also galvanized Manley's interest in the subject. First, there
was virtually no information on the topic of sexual harassment and li-
brarians.57 And second, the November 1992 murder of a small-town
Arizona librarian after she had been raped. His article concluded, "We
need to begin looking at the issue of sexual harassment of library work-
ers by library patrons as seriously as we look at the issue of the patron's
right to access."58
By the July/August 1993 issue, Manley had tabulated the 3,758
responses to his survey.59 Seventy-three percent of the respondents
reported that they had been sexually harassed by patrons," and of those
harassed, eighty-three percent reported both verbal and visual
The relevant questions were as follows:
6. Have you every been sexually harassed by a supervisor or coworker on
your library job?
__ Yes No
7. Have you ever been sexually harassed by a library patron?
__ Yes __ No
Manley asserts that the entire questionnaire, entitled "Librarians and Sex," which was
intended as a joke, resulted in his termination as a columnist in the WILSON LIBRARY
BULLETIN. Manley, supra.
57. In fact, in some cases there may be outright disinformation. In a 1988 article on legal
issues in libraries, the authors stated: "To be considered [actionable under Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act], a sexual harassment case must include all these qualifi-
cations: the harassment must be of a sexual nature, it must be a condition of
employment, and the harassing employee must be acting in a supervisory capacity."
Joseph J. Mika & Bruce A. Shuman, Legal Issues Affecting Libraries and Librarians, 19
AMERICAN LIBRARIES 26, 31 (1988). This statement was later corrected by a reader
who pointed out that sexual harassment can include (1) cases based on a hostile envi-
ronment, and (2) cases in which the perpetrator is a co-worker or patron. Mary
Whisner, Reader Forum: Harassment Discussion Misleading, 19 AMERICAN LIBRARIEs
346 (1988).
58. Manley, supra note 55, at 68.
59. Will Manley, Sexual harassment by patrons: Part two, 24 AMERICAN LIBRARIES 652
(1993).
60. Id. When asked "In the past 12 months how often have you been sexually harassed by
library patrons?" the responses break down as follows:
Daily 7%
Weekly 22%
Monthly 40%
Less than monthly 4%
Never 27%
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harassment.6' Forty percent of those harassed reported incidents of
physical harassment.62 By his admission, the author conceded that this
was not a scientific survey, but he stated that the intensity of the issue
was best measured by the written comments elicited by the survey which
were included with the article, a sample of which include:
My director seems to care more about the rights of our patrons
than the safety of our employees.
I resigned my last job because of constant sexual harassment
by three patrons whom my director refused to confront.
Many of us have a latent sense of dread. People yell and
threaten us over the smallest things and we cannot defend our-
selves. Resist the slings and arrows of outrageous patrons and
you will find your butt in a sling. I am angry at this attitude of
"eat garbage and like it" public service and I am angry at fund-
ing authorities who never release enough money to secure
adequate staffing or proper security.
I feel powerless in front of my patrons and have been given no
choice by my administration than to endure the daily abuse.63
Manley followed the survey with two more columns devoted to this
topic. In the first follow-up column, he devoted his attention to
administrative responses to employee complaints of patron sexual
64harassment. By this time he had had time to collate the comments on
the questionnaires, and realized that not only had he measured the
prevalence of sexual harassment by patrons, but that he had also
measured the attitudes that employees had towards their supervisors and
administrators. The vast majority of responses indicated that many
supervisors were not aware of their employees' harassment problems,
and to the extent that employees reported patron harassment, the
reports were met with hostility, engendering a fear of retaliation in the
employees.65 Manley went further than tallying responses and tried to
discern reasons for the lack of administrative response on this issue. In
61. Id. at 652.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Will Manley, Sexual Harassment by Patrons: Part Three, 24 AMERICAN LIBRARIES 756
(1993).
65. Id.
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this setting, he noted, the public relations issues, faced by commercial
establishments are complicated by First Amendment values that favor
access to libraries over an employee's right to safety.66 In conclusion,67
Manley referred to a recent federal court case suggesting that
employers may be held accountable for the acts of non-employees.
In his final column on this issue,68 Manley noted that in the inter-
vening time, he had heard from a number of library administrators
about this problem. He devoted the column to their suggestions for so-
lutions to the problem as well as a few of his own. Many of the
administrators stated that as a result of Manley's columns, they had sur-
veyed their own staff to determine the extent of the problem, and then
had worked with staff to develop solutions. The administrators com-
mented that, "[a]s usual, some of the best ideas came from the staff."69
Finally, Manley stressed that solutions and policies would have to be
developed on a "library-by-library" basis that is responsive to local con-
ditions.
Manley is not the only librarian who has addressed patron sexual
harassment.° A 1991 article lists examples of patron harassment, and
the way in which the Iowa State University Library attempted to address
the issue." Noting that most libraries had addressed classic sexual har-
assment, the authors went on to note that most had been "strangely
silent" about patron/employee harassment. Quite aptly, they defined the
issue in these terms: "In an organization that is defined by a service phi-
66. Id.
67. Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D.Nev. 1992). In this case,
the employee had complained about sexual harassment by casino customers, and in
response she had been terminated. The court, relying on Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, held that the employer can be liable for acts
of non-employees where they know of the conduct and fail to take remedial action.
In this case, the court denied the employer's motion to dismiss. See infra notes 192-
200 and accompanying text.
68. Will Manley, Sexual harassment by patrons: Part four, 24 AMERICAN LIBRARIES 828
(1993).
69. Id.
70. A recently published book, Dealing with Difficult People in the Library, recognizes
some of these problems. This book describes problem situations and suggests both
policies and practices to protect librarians. In an appendix, the author adds sample
policies from several libraries. The issue of sexual harassment, however, is not dealt
with directly but rather subsumed in a chapter entitled "Real Problem Cases."
Clearly, library publications still have a way to go. MARK R. WILLIS, DEALING WITH
DIFFICULT PEOPLE IN THE LIBRARY (1999).
71. Mary Lou Goodyear & William K. Black, Combating sexual harassment: A public
service perspective, 22 AMERICAN LIBRARIES 134 (1991).
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losophy, how far does one go in meeting patron needs without subject-
ing oneself to unwanted advances?"72 The Iowa State Library undertook
three approaches to combating patron harassment: they developed a pol-
icy,73 worked with other units in the university (e.g., security, student
life), and held training sessions for affected staff.74
Lastly, Sarah Watstein wrote a two-part series about library har-
assment, that began with the "principle that everyone deserves the right
to work in an environment free from any type of harassment, an envi-
ronment where respect for an individual is encouraged and
safeguarded."75 Agreeing that very little in the library literature has ad-
dressed sexual harassment,76 in her first article she outlines the law on
sexual harassment, suggests procedures to follow and reviews the library
literature. She concluded by asking for personal accounts of sexual har-
assment in the library setting. Her second article77 chronicles the
responses. Although the majority of responses dealt with supervisor or
co-worker harassment, she did note that several respondents had ad-
dressed patron harassment.8 Finally, she concluded by noting that
much sexual harassment is still under-reported, and an excerpt points
out why this might be so:
What makes me nervous about bringing complaints to per-
sonnel departments or library directors is what those
inquisitions of Anita Hill never seemed to consider: the career
woman is supposed to be in control. If someone shows disre-
spect toward me, I fear that management will view me as
lacking in assertiveness, strength, and authority-and not,
therefore "administrative material": why couldn't I just handle
the problem?
72. Id. at 135.
73. The Iowa State University Policy has three parts. First, it prohibits sexual harassment,
including patron harassment: "Harassment can occur between ... library staff and li-
brary patrons." Second, it defines harassment. Third, it describes the procedures for
reporting and dealing with incidents of harassment. Id. at 134.
74. Id. at 135-36.
75. Sarah Barbara Watstein, Disturbances in the Field: Sexual Harassment and Libraries,
WILSoN LIBRARY BULLETIN, May 1993, at 31.
76. Id. at 33.
77. Sarah Barbara Watstein, Disturbances in the Field: Sexual Harassment and Libraries:
Stories from the Front, WILSON LIBRARY BULLETIN, Nov. 1993, 43.
78. Id. at 45.
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All this I did in a primarily female profession. My suspicion
that reporting the incidents, which took place at several insti-
tutions, would not have gained anything, seemed confirmed
when women administrators feigned ignorance of harassment
ever occurring in our workplaces and when male administra-
tors either joked about the problem or acted so extremely
protective that they robbed women of our autonomy and right
79to decide for ourselves in these matters.
D. Summary ofFindings
This section demonstrates that sexual harassment is not just a phe-
nomenon that occurs among co-workers; customers and clients harass
employees across a wide spectrum of businesses and occupations. No
one is immune. This behavior, especially because it tends to be ignored
in the interest of promoting sales or business revenue, means that em-
ployees endure yet another unnecessary stress at the workplace. "Clients
and customers can also use the power of their position-go along or I'll
give the sale to somebody else-as a license for licentiousness ... 
II. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THIRD PARTY HARASSMENT
As a marked contrast to the number of anecdotal reports of third
party harassment, and growing empirical documentation, the legal
world is basically as silent about this type of harassment as it was to sex-
ual harassment generally in the 1970s. This section of the article
sketches what law does exist on this subject, to prepare the reader for
consideration of how it could be brought "up-to-date" to match the
overall development of law in this field.
A. Basic Sexual Harassment Law
Although finally confirmed as a valid doctrine in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson,"' sexual harassment has one of the more interesting doc-
79. Id.
80. Deutschman & Hammes, supra note 14, at 145.
81. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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trinal histories in Title VII law.82 Title VII protects employees against
sex discrimination in the workplace, and it became effective in 1965.83
However, it was not until 1976 that a federal court first recognized a
cause of action for sexual harassment. 8" Another ten years passed before
the Supreme Court recognized it.
Meritor 5 confirmed much of the activity of the lower courts, and
set the pattern for future sexual harassment doctrine. In that case, a
bank employee alleged that over her four-year tenure, her supervisor, the
vice-president of the bank, had harassed her on numerous occasions,
including forcibly raping her.86 The Court, both in holdings and dicta,
established a number of basic sexual harassment principles:
1. Sexual harassment violates Title VII.
8 7
2. Sexual harassment includes economic as well as intangible
88injury.
3. Employer liability will depend upon the type of harass-
ment, and the harasser's status within the employing
entity."
4. An employer may mitigate liability by implementing an
appropriate harassment policy and grievance procedure. 8
In coming to these conclusions, it is significant that the Court de-
ferred to the EEOC Guidelines which had previously recognized both
forms of harassment and propounded theories of liability.91 The Court
82. For a review of this history see LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 3. Two noted early
cases are Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Williams v. Saxbe, 413
F.Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). Prior to Meritor, the lead (and still important) case for
detailing both types of harassment was Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th
Cir. 1982).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1999). Title VII also forbids discrimination on the basis of
race, national origin, color and religion. Separate statutes address discrimination on
the basis of age and disability.
84. Williams, 413 F.Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Williams v. Williams, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
85. 477 U.S. 57.
86. Id. at 59-61.
87. Id. at 64. This is not as self-evident as it appears.
88. Id. at 64-65 (recognizing two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo, in which the
employer conditions employment on the proffering of sexual favors, and hostile envi-
ronment harassment, in which the work conditions interfere with an individual's
ability to work).
89. Id. at 69-73.
90. Id. at 72-73.
91. Id. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985), and noting that the EEOC had
drawn on previous decisions of its own as well as those of the courts). The role of the
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stated that for hostile environment harassment to be actionable, "it must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the vic-
tim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.' 92
Elaborating on its holding, the Court stated that "(t)he gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwel-
come. "' The Court's holding, while welcome in confirming the
illegality of sexual harassment, failed to develop sexual harassment doc-
trine in any level of detail, especially as it pertained to hostile
environment harassment or the contours of employer liability.
Seven years later, in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,4 the Court issued
another early opinion concerning sexual harassment. In a situation
where an employee had been subjected to numerous incidents of verbal
sexual innuendos and insults, the Court clarified what treatment a sex-
ual harassment victim must undergo to make a viable claim. The lower
courts had split on the issue of whether the plaintiff needed to prove a
serious injury to her psychological well-being. 5 Affirming the vitality of
EEOC in advancing the law of sexual harassment cannot be understated. It laid the
foundation for later developments in the courts. The full text of the cited Guideline is
as follows:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term of
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment deci-
sions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 16 04 .11(a). Additionally, at 29 C.F.R. § 16 04 .11(e), the
Commission stated that "[ain employer may also be responsible for the acts
of non-employees ... , where the employer ... knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate correc-
tive action." The EEOC has supplemented these guidelines with additional
statements. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 615 (2002) (pertaining to
charges of sexual harassment); EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harass-
ment, in FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES MANUAL (1990).
Additional parts of the guidelines address employer liability, and do include
provisions for third party harassment on a knew "or should have known" basis cou-
pled with a duty "to take immediate and appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R.
§ 16 06.8(e) (2000).
92. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson V. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)).
93. Id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 16 04 .11 (a) (1985)).
94. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
95. Id. at 20.
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Meritor, the Court chose a "middle path," and rejected both the idea
that merely offensive remarks could constitute harassment or that the
plaintiff must show the conduct caused a "tangible psychological in-
jury." Thus, a workplace that is "permeated with 'discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment,'" is actionable. 6 Additionally, the Court estab-
lished that the plaintiff must show that the environment is objectively
hostile or abusive, and that they perceived it to be so, i.e., the conduct
affected the conditions of their employment. 7
Continuing in its brief opinion, the Court noted that this type of
harassment can affect "job performance, discourage employees from re-
maining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers," and
thus undermine Title VII's rule of "workplace equality."' 8 Acknowledg-
ing that this is not a "precise test," and that the fact finder must look "at
all the circumstances," the Court suggested that the following factors be
considered: "[T] he frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance."" Thus, while this case eliminates any type of bright
line test for proving harassment, it appears to limit the doctrine to those
cases in which the harassment is deemed objectively harassing, is per-
ceived as harassing by the victim, and actually interferes with the
victim's ability to work.
96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. Id. Note that the Court did not resolve the question of whether the applicable stan-
dard is that of a reasonable person or a reasonable woman, a conflict that is brewing
in the lower courts. While the court did phrase this part of the decision in terms of a
"reasonable person," it did not comment on why those words were chosen.
98. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
99. Id. at 22-23. Justices Scalia and Ginsburg prepared concurring opinions. Justice
Scalia fretted about the vagueness of the majority's standard and the lack of weights
to be assigned to the factors, but he was unable to offer an alternative. Id. at 24-25.
In comparing the majority's standard to that used in negligence cases, he suggests that
negligence is at least restrained by the idea of real harm whereas harassment cases are
not. Id. at 24. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence focused the majority opinion by stating
that the critical inquiry would be "whether members of one sex are exposed to disad-
vantageous terms or conditions of employment to which other members of one sex
are not exposed." Id. at 25. She elaborated by adding that the fact finder should de-
termine whether the "discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiffs work performance." Id. at 25. In other words, making it "more difficult to
do the job." Id. (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th
Cir. 1988)).
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Although the lower courts have continued to elaborate and develop
the standards and factors announced by the Supreme Court,' °° most
cases focus on the following five part prima facie case:
1) the basis: membership in a protected group;
2) the activity: unwelcome conduct of a sexual [sex-based]
nature;
3) the issue: affecting a term and condition of employment;
4) the causal connection: on the basis of sex; and
5) employer responsibility.' °'
Obviously, there are some variations within the circuit courts,
102
but the discussion in this article will work from this generally accepted
framework.
Finally, in a blizzard of activity in mid-1998, the Court issued four
sexual harassment decisions, 10 3 three of them pertaining to the work-
place: Oncale v. Sundowner Offihore Services, Inc., Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton,'°5 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.'°6 While the first
100. See, e.g., Dawn B. Bennett-Alexander, Lower Court Interpretation of the Meritor Deci-
sion: Putting Flesh on the Supreme Court's Sexual Harassment Skeleton, 6 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1991) (reviewing later cases as she examines the prima facie ele-
ments of a sexual harassment case).
101. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 3, at 168-69. The framework, the authors note, is
adopted from Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1982). Their major change is
to replace the Henson court's term "respondeat superior" with "employer responsibil-
ity" because the courts have, in their opinion, actually gone beyond "respondeat
superior" in these cases. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 3, at 169 n.20.
102. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 3, at 169 n.21 (cataloging the ways in which the
second, third, fourth, ninth and federal circuit courts differ from this formulation).
For example, the ninth circuit, in EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (1989),
described the following prima facie case:
(1) subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) conduct was unwelcome; (3)
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of employ-
ment and create abusive working environment; and (4) employer failed to
remedy or prevent hostile environment of which management level em-
ployees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known.
Id.
103. The case of Gebser v. Lago Vista Indpt. School Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (involving
the liability of a school district, under Title IX, for a teacher's sexual harassment of a
student).
104. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
105. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
106. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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of these three cases addressed the issue of same sex harassment, the last
two jointly discussed the issue of employer liability that had been left
hanging in Meritor. All three make contributions that will make bring-
ing a case of third party harassment easier as well as spelling out what
employers need to do to avoid liability for any form of sexual harass-
107
ment.
In the first, Oncale, the Court addressed a situation in which a male
employee had been repeatedly and crudely harassed by his male co-
workers. While the case will generally be noted for its holding that same
sex harassment is actionable under Title VII, Justice Scalia, author of the
opinion, made other pronouncements about sexual harassment doctrine
generally. First, in disavowing that sexual harassment erects a "general
civility code," Justice Scalia noted that the linchpin of actionable sexual
harassment is not necessarily sexualized conduct, but rather conduct
which puts a member of one sex at a disadvantage compared to the
other as it pertains to terms and conditions of employment. 08 Second,
as it pertains to sexuality in the workplace, he stated that compliance
with Title VII "requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the work-
place; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the
'conditions' of the victim's employment." Reviewing courts must pay
attention to the context of the behavior, employing common sense so
that "ordinary socializing" does not become forbidden or actionable.' 9
Thus, while this case involved highly sexualized facts, it nonetheless un-
derscored that these cases address situations in which women are
economically disadvantaged by a wide range of behaviors.
The companion cases of Faragher and Ellerth addressed important
and previously unresolved questions of employer liability that had split
the lower courts. In Faragher, two male supervisors repeatedly harassed a
female lifeguard who did not report the harassment to the city."0 After
reviewing the prior case law which outlines the contours of acceptable
107. It appears that not all lower courts understood the holdings of these cases. Schnapper
argues that many judges in lower courts still do not follow the holdings of these cases,
resulting in inconsistent holdings for cases involving similar or identical conduct. Eric
Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don't Get It: Hostile Work Environment Litigation in
the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277. This finding suggests similar problems
for the prosecution of third party sexual harassment claims.
108. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
109. Id. Interestingly, the Court in Faragher makes this same point indirectly when refer-
ring to the racial harassment cases on which the sexual harassment cases are founded.
524 U.S. at 788 (citing LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAw, 349 n.36 (3d ed. 1996), stating that "[d]iscourtesy or rudeness should not be
confused with racial harassment."
110. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780-82.
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and unacceptable workplace behavior, the Court observed that it had
"established few definite rules for determining" employer liability. 1 '
While Meritor had called for attention to common law agency princi-
ples,112 these principles had never been developed. Not surprisingly, the
lower court in Faragher considered three grounds for possible employer
liability: the scope of employment, if the agency "aided" the harassment,
and whether the employer had constructive knowledge of the harass-
ment.
The first, the scope of employment, has not generally been
successful in Title VII sexual harassment cases, but Justice Souter,
writing for the majority, deftly pointed out that assignment of conduct
within the scope of employment represents a policy judgment as to
where the cost of employee misconduct should be placed. Even after
considering that factor, Justice Souter rejected scope of employment as
the basis of liability.
1 13
Second, the Court considered whether the basis of vicarious liabil-
ity in this case might rest on the Restatement of Agency § 219(2)(d)
notion that imposes liability where the fact of the agency relationship
aided the supervisor in pursuing actionable sexual harassment. This, the
Court decided, would be "an appropriate starting point" for analyzing
liability. The Court reasoned that the agency relationship places the
employee in proximity to a supervisor, thereby making the employee
reluctant to report the supervisor. At the same time, the court suggested
that employers generally make great efforts in selecting, training, and
monitoring supervisory behavior, possibly in the hope that it would be
easier for employees to confide in well-trained supervisors. 114 But the
Court conditioned this basis for liability on the creation of a two part
affirmative defense in which the employer could avoid liability by show-
ing that it created a mechanism to avoid and/or eliminate harassment,
and that the employee had failed to make reasonable use of the safe-
guards."1 5 As to the third possible ground, imputing liability, the Court
111. Id. at 788.
112. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The Court pointed to the Restatement of Agency
§§ 219-237, although it cautioned that "common-law principles may not be trans-
ferable in all their particulars to Title VII." Id.
113. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798-800.
114. Id. at 803.
115. Id. at 805. The Court formally holding that:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible em-
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was constrained by the Meritor holding that an employer not be held
"automatically" liable because of the acts of its supervisors." 6 The lower
courts had approached this in two ways: (1) requiring proof of an af-
firmative action invocation of supervisorial authority before imputing
liability, or (2) recognizing an affirmative defense even where the super-
visor had created an actionable environment."7 The first alternative was
rejected as a grounds for imputing liability because it is often difficult to
determine when supervisory authority, as opposed to personal inclina-
tion, for an act has been invoked. This difficulty, in the Court's view,
would "poorly serve[]" parties and create more litigation."8 Focusing on
Title VII's goal of prevention, and adding their previous observations
about vicarious liability (option two), the Court created the two part
affirmative defense discussed in the previous paragraph."'
In Ellerth, the Court continued its analysis of employer liability. 20
In this seven to two decision, plaintiff Ellerth alleged that she was
constantly harassed by her supervisor.'2' Although her employer,
Burlington Industries, had a sexual harassment policy, Ellerth did not
ployment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, see Fed. Rule. Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two neces-
sary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm oth-
erwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a
matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment cir-
cumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the
first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to ful-
fill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not
limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure
provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally
suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the
defense. No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
Id. at 807-08.
116. Id. at 804.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 805.
119. Id. at 807-08.
120. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
121. Id. at 747-48. The case was originally decided as a motion for summary judgment,
granted in favor of the employer, so the facts alleged by employee Ellerth had to be
taken as true. Id. at 747.
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inform anyone of the harassment, nor did she suffer any tangible
economic detriment.'22 Given the confusion in the lower courts after
Meritor, it was not surprising that the Seventh Circuit judges reviewing
this case produced "eight separate opinions and no consensus for a
controlling rationale."'
123
In the first part of its analysis of this case, Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority of the Court, considered the utility of the phrases "quid
pro quo" and "hostile work environment," noting that these terms
developed in the academic literature rather than from any statutory
language. Further, although the Court in Meritor had not attached
significance to these terms as it pertained to employer liability, lower
courts had done so, suggesting that the standard of responsibility turned
upon the "type" of harassment. But in this case, Justice Kennedy writes,
the issue is not the type of harassment, for under a theory of vicarious
liability the only determinative issue is whether discrimination
occurred. 1
24
Thus framed, the issue in Ellerth was again the exact contours of
employer liability under the agency principles that inform, although do
not control, interpretations of Title VII. Using Restatement Section
219(1), '25 Justice Kennedy reiterated the Faragher observation that a
supervisor's sexual harassment is "not conduct within the scope of em-
ployment," in part because of the supervisor's personal motives for
pursuing this behavior. 26 Thus, the appropriate frame of analysis is sup-
plied by Section 219(2) of the Restatement of Torts which discusses
grounds of liability such as apparent authority. But, like Faragher, the
Court rejected apparent authority, and relied instead upon the "aided in
the agency relation rule" as the basis of developing a coherent theory of
liability. 127
Having decided upon "aided in agency" as the basis of liability, the
decision then proceeds to map out the contours of the doctrine. While
acknowledging that this theory assumes the proximity that would make
122. Id. at 748,750.
123. Id. at 749.
124. Id. at 753.
125. That section states: "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants com-
mitted while acting in the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
126. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757.
127. Id. at 760. Before concluding this analysis, the Court notes that negligence, in a knew
or should have known sense, is the minimum standard of liability for the employer
under Title VII. Id. at 759.
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harassment possible, the employment relationship is not sufficient to
impose liability. There must be some type of "plus" factor. In what
would have been called the "quid pro quo" cases, this is easily supplied
by the supervisor's interference with tangible conditions of employment.
The interference "proves" the agency relationship in the sense that it
could not have occurred but for the agency. 21 When it came to defining
what the bounds of aided in agency would be for non-tangible behav-
iors, e.g., unfilled threats, the Court ducked the issue. While noting that
many acts in this category may indeed be aided by agency, others will
look like those of co-workers. This being the case, the Court leaves this
area of the law to further development.
129
The Court concluded, however, by noting that other factors in ad-
dition to agency principles shape employer liability in these cases, most
specifically the Title VII policy of preventing liability in the first place
through the design of anti-discrimination employment policies. These
policies also help further the Title VII goals of deterrence, as well as the
borrowed tort doctrine of "avoidable consequences." The Court ended
its decision, therefore, by adopting the holding in Faragher as being ap-
plicable in this case as well. The Court states that holding as follows:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. When no tangible employment action is
taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense
to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of
the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ Proc. 8(c). The defense com-
prises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unrea-
sonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm oth-
erwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an
anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not neces-
sary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated
policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appro-
priately be addressed in any case when litigating the first
128. Id. at 760-62.
129. Id. at 763. The failure of the Court to provide any guidelines here is a notable lapse
since most cases of sexual harassment involve what we might now call either hostile
environment or non-tangible outcome harassment.
2002]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
element of the defense. And while proof that an employee
failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care
to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable fail-
ure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer,
a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy
the employer's burden under the second element of the de-
fense. No affirmative defense is available, however, when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassign-
130
ment.
Ellerth's case was remanded so that she could attempt to prove li-
ability without the labels "quid pro quo" or "hostile environment" being
controlling in subsequent litigation. 131
B. Third Party Harassment: Cases and Articles
1. The Costume Cases: To date, sexual harassment by third parties
has been legally recognized only where the employer has required the
employee to wear a uniform or costume, as a condition of employment,
that subjected them to harassment from members of the public, includ-
ing customers and clients. Although it is well recognized that employers
may generally impose dress codes that differentiate between the two
sexes, 132 these cases establish the proposition that an employer may not
impose dress codes that invite harassment from co-workers or from cus-
tomers, clients or other third parties. Typically, the employer has
130. Id. at 765. This tracks, word for word, the holding in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
131. In addition to the issues raised by Schnapper's article, supra note 107, Medina raises
concerns about judicial use of the summary judgment motion in these cases. Follow-
ing the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs have a right to a jury in these
cases; consequently, many lower court judges are taking away factual determinations
from the jury. This means that citizens are not being allowed to contribute to the de-
velopment of doctrine. M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and
Summary Judgments, 4 REV. OF L. AND WOMEN'S STUD. 311 (1999). I would hy-
pothesize that juries might be more sympathetic than judges to claims of customer
harassment.
132. See, e.g., LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 3, at 249 (citing BARBARA LINDEMANN
SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 410-17 (2d ed.
1983), FIVE-YEAR SUPPLEMENT 144 (1989).
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required that women wear "provocative" attire, or in some other, non-
job related way, draw attention to the women as sexual objects. 3
The leading and earliest case on this point is EEOC v. Sage Realty
Corp. 1 4 In this case, plaintiff Margaret Hassleman was employed as a
lobby attendant in a New York office building. Her duties included
security, safety, maintenance and information functions. Her employer,
Sage, furnished uniforms to all lobby attendants on a seasonal basis. Her
instructions for employment made it absolutely clear that she must be in
her employer supplied uniform at all times, and that no excuse would be
acceptable. Although she had complaints about earlier outfits, the
lawsuit revolved around the design and fit of the 1976 Bicentennial
uniform. This "uniform was constructed in the shape of a red-white-
and-blue octagon with an opening in the center for the lobby
attendant's head."'35 It was designed to be worn as a poncho with
minimal tacking at the sides, leaving the lobby attendants', all female,
36
sides exposed. Other than "blue dancer pants" they were not permitted
to wear any other garments, such as a shirt or leotard, under this outfit.
Hasselman, the tallest of the attendants, protested that the one size fits
all outfit was revealing and poorly made, exposing her sides, thighs and
buttocks. Numerous attempts at alterations did not leave this outfit any
less revealing, and after being ordered to wear it she was subjected to
repeated harassment and felt unable to perform her job duties. Although
her employer was aware of her situation, 3 7 it did nothing to remedy it.
When Hassleman refused to wear the uniform, she was ordered off the
floor and given a lay-off letter.'38
The court found that requiring Hasselman to wear this "revealing
and sexually provocative" outfit violated Title VII. Moreover, the court
noted that it "could reasonably be expected that were such an outfit to
be worn ..., she would be subjected to sexual harassment." 39 Addition-
ally, the court soundly rejected the following employer arguments:
133. The EEOC, in its compliance manual, states that "in some cases the mere require-
ment that females wear sexually provocative uniforms may itself be evidence of sexual
harassment." EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 619.4 (2000) (grooming standards).
134. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
135. Id. at 604.
136. In the fall of 1975, when the ownership of the building changed hands, the cleaning
contractor, who hired the lobby attendants, no longer hired males. Id. at 604 n.8.
137. Hasselman sent her employer a letter in which she stated that none of the duties or
responsibilities of the job "requires me to be a sex symbol in skimpy costume." Id. at
606 n.12.
138. Id. at 601-07.
139. Id. at 607.
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1. That an employer has an unfettered prerogative to impose
reasonable dress and grooming requirements;
1 40
2. That the uniform was a form of artistic expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment;1 41 and
3. That wearing the uniform was a bona fide occupational
qualification.
142
In discussion, the court made it clear that it saw little difference be-
tween this form of harassment and that made illegal in cases where
supervisors harassed employees. Analogizing to these cases, the court
stated that the employer here knew that Hasselman had been subjected
to harassment, and thus had made her acceptance of sexual harassment,
by members of the public and building tenants, a condition of employ-
ment. 43 To end any doubts, the court stated in a footnote: "Employers
may once have been able to engage with impunity in the type of con-
duct that unquestioningly allowed women to be treated as sex objects.
But this is no longer the case."144
In similar cases after the Sage decision, federal courts rejected the
idea that employers could unilaterally impose dress codes that subjected
female employees to harassment from the public. For example, in
Marentette v. Michigan Host,'45 the plaintiff cocktail waitresses were re-
quired to wear provocative uniforms which led to harassment by
customers. Despite knowledge of the harassment, the employer had
failed to remedy this situation, which the court noted could be in viola-
tion of Title VIC"146 Six years later, a federal court found that where
cocktail waitresses were required to wear revealing outfits as well as flirt
with customers, the resulting sexual harassment and the employer's
knowledge of it were in violation of Title VII. 47
. Although there are now fewer reported cases involving employer
dress policies, the case of Schonauer v. DCR Entertainment, Inc.'48 dem-
onstrates that employers still make these illegal demands, in this case
140. Id. at 608-09.
141. Id. at 610.
142. Id. at 611.
143. Id. at 609-10.
144. Id. at 610 n.16.
145. 506 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
146. Id. at 912.
147. EEOC v. Newtown Inn Assoc., 647 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Va. 1986).
148. 905 P.2d 392 (Wash.Ct.App. 1995).
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attempting to insist on partial nudity for a female employee.'49 There,
plaintiff was employed as a waitress at a topless nightclub. Her place of
employment distinguished between waitresses (clothed) and dancers
(partially nude). The dress code for waitresses did not include provoca-
tive attire; rather, the posted dress code dryly stated "No T-shirt, no
shorts, no sweater." Her employer repeatedly pressed her to take part in
nude waitress contests, but she refused and was eventually fired. After
her termination, she filed a charge for sexual harassment and other
claims.15°
Before the trial court, the defendant successfully moved for sum-
mary judgment. Drawing heavily on Title VII precedent, the court of
appeals, however, noted that sexual harassment is actionable under
Washington law. Observing that she was hired as a waitress, not a
dancer, the appeals court also noted that a jury could infer that this cre-
ated a hostile and offensive work environment. Reversing the trial court,
the court stated that the employer's attempt to require plaintiff to dance
in the nude, against her wishes, "arguably created a hostile working en-
vironment for someone hired to wait tables .... 151
Taken as a group, these cases establish two principles. First, that an
employer cannot use a dress code defense to legitimate a policy that re-
quires an employee to dress in a sexually provocative manner. The
Schnonauer case, although not discussed as a costume case by the court,
suggests also that an employer's purported business needs cannot justify
the imposition of sexually provocative dress or behavior on a non-
consenting employee. Second, these cases also establish that in situa-
tions, where job requirements place employees in positions where they
are likely to be harassed, courts are willing to deem the harassment fore-
seeable and a violation of Title VII.
2. Third Party Cases: Despite the data presented in the first part of
this article, there are only about a dozen cases that can legitimately be
described as third party sexual harassment cases. In about half of those
149. One author argues that even where women voluntarily take jobs involving nudity, the
protections of Title VII sexual harassment doctrine should still be available. Joshua
Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment Protection: Can It Support
A Hostile Work Environment Claim Brought by a Nude Dancer?, 24 N.Y.U. REv. oF L.
& Soc. CHANGE 271 (1998).
150. Schonauer, 905 P.2d at 397-401.
151. Id. at 401. This case does not directly discuss the issue of harassment by customers.
One presumes, however, that concern was a basis for plaintiffs refusal to take part in
the nude waitress contest. Additionally, the court declined to rule whether these facts
created a "hostile working environment for someone hired to dance nude on a stage."
Id.
20021
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
cases, the third party harassment is incidental to co-worker harassment or
is not discussed usefully by the court. An early case, however, is Dorn-
hecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp.'52 In that case, a contract consultant
hired by her employer to aid in marketing is initially described as a "co-
worker.""' On several different occasions, Robert Rockefeller, the con-
tract consultant, touched plaintiff Dornhecker and finally "playfully"
choked her at a business dinner after she complained about his behavior.
Her supervisor tried to console Dornhecker and reported this behavior to
the company president. Rockefeller's contract was not renewed nor did he
attend any more of the sales meetings. Dornhecker had resigned after be-
ing told that Rockefeller would be present for the remaining day-and-a-
half duration of the sales meetings, deeming company management unre-
sponsive."'
Rather than focusing on the third party issue, apparently because the
court mistakenly characterized Rockefeller as a co-employee, the court
focused on whether the company took the "prompt remedial action" that
can forestall Title VII liability in sexual harassment cases. Finding that the
behavior was not that severe and the company's response prompt, the
court noted that in assessing the promptness of any remediation, the
court should consider "[a] company's lines of command, organizational
format and immediate business demands."'55 Additionally, based on the
facts of this case, i.e., this incident arose in a two day time span, the court
found that the employer's actions were decisive. Thus, although helpful
on the duty to remedy an offensive work environment, the case adds
nothing to a third party corpus.
In several of these peripheral third party cases, the third party inci-
dents are mentioned only in passing or pale in comparison to the acts of
co-workers. In one case, for example, co-workers repeatedly harassed a
female long-haul truck driver.'56 The court notes in its finding of facts
that while making a delivery, a male supervisor at the customer's plant
touched her breast. When she reported this incident, her own supervisor
told her "that 'the customer is always right' and that she should stay away
from that person in the future."'57 In its conclusions of law, however, the
152. 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987).
153. Judge Edith Jones writes: "The behavior of a co-worker at the Malibu Grand Prix Corpo-
ration proved too racy for Marvelle Dornhecker." Id. at 308. This gratuitous comment
offers one example of judicial attitudes towards sexual harassment.
154. Id. at 308-09.
155. Id. at 309.
156. Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
157. Id. at 371-72.
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court focuses exclusively on the acts of her co-workers and supervisors; the
incident with the customer is never fruitfully discussed.'58
In another case, most of plaintiffs complaints were about her super-
visors and co-workers.59 As part of her claim of a hostile sexual
environment against her employer, New York Telephone Company, she
described graffiti directed at her, written on the walls of the JFK Air-
port. ' Although the bulk of the conclusions of law in the opinion deal
with other sex discrimination issues, the court notes that even if her em-
ployer did not have the authority to remove the graffiti on its own, at the
very least, it could have contacted airport management to see what it
could have done.'6 ' The court concluded that not having attempted this
minimal effort was a breach of New York Telephone's duty to plaintiff.'
62
Some cases do not discuss the third party issues because of threshold
procedural errors that prevent a discussion on the merits. In Massarella v.
Quality Inn, Inc., although the plaintiff alleged a direct case of third party
harassment-a guest at the hotel made advances-plaintiffs claim failed
to survive a motion to dismiss and a motion for partial summary judg-
ment because of numerous pleading errors and errors of procedure under
Title VII.' 63 Specifically, plaintiff failed to allege facts that would demon-
strate that the defendants knew or should have known of the guest's
conduct, and that the employer failed to take appropriate remedial ac-
tion.164 At the very least, this case serves as a warning to plaintiffs counsel
that pleading employer knowledge is essential to the success of all third
party claims.
Similarly, in Waltman v. International Paper Co., plaintiff Susan
Waltman brought an action against her employer for sexual harassment.
65
Along with numerous incidents of co-worker harassment, she alleged that
employees of another company, who were present at her workplace, also
harassed her.166 Although her employer did not discipline her co-workers
for the alleged harassment, it did contact the third party employer and
158. Id. at 377-81. Most of the discussion focuses on the tolling period for Tide VII daims,
and the hostile environment harassment caused by her co-workers and supervisors. The
only mention of the third party claim is as follows: "There is no dispute that appropriate
Celanese employees knew about the July 20 incident at the Celco facility." Id at 380.
159. Danna v. N.Y. Telephone Co., 752 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
160. Id. at 608.
161. Id. at 611.
162. Id.
163. No. 89 C 1507, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7736 at *5 (N.D. II. June 26,1989).
164. Id.
165. 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989).
166. Id. at 471.
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those employees were disciplined by their own employer.' In the district
court, the defendants were granted partial summary judgment based on
their argument that Waltman's claims were time barred and that
Waltman had not informed them of the harassment. The court of appeals
overturned the district court's entry of partial summary judgment,
without any discussion of the third party issue. The decision of the
appeals court focused on procedural errors, co-worker harassment, and on
whether the plaintiff had established a continuing violation of Title VII. 168
A final example is Churchman v. Pinkterton ' Inc., in which plaintiff,
a security guard, alleged that she had been harassed by employees of one
of the companies to which she had been assigned.' She had reported the
harassment both to her employer and to the company for which she pro-
vided security. 7° In response to her complaint, the defendants (both her
employer and the company at which the harassment took place) filed mo-
tions for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff had falsified
her employment application, and that this barred her Title VII claims.'
The court, in granting these motions,72 was thus not compelled to com-
ment on the merits of plaintiffs allegations.
Luckily, there are a few cases in which the courts grapple with the
merits of allegations of third party harassment. In almost all of these cases,
the courts comment that these are cases of the first impression in their
jurisdiction. These cases are reviewed below in chronological order.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued
the earliest reported case.'73 In that case, the charging party was a waitress
at a restaurant. One evening, four male customers entered the restaurant
and proceeded to make lewd comments directed at the waitress. In addi-
tion, they attempted to grab her and one customer succeeded in squeezing
167. Id. at 472.
168. However the court does discuss one issue that is equally relevant to co-employee and third
party claims: employer knowledge. The court aptly notes that "[t]here is some uncertainty
in the law" regarding the parameters of employer knowledge necessary to make out a
primafacie case. Id. at 478. In this case, the court stated that Waltman could show actual
notice since she had complained to "higher" management on three occasions as well as
constructive notice because of the pervasiveness of the harassment, e.g., graffiti in numer-
ous locations at her workplace. Id.
169. 756 F. Supp. 515, 518 (D. Kan. 1991).
170. Id. at 518-19.
171. Id. at516.
172. Id. at 521.
173. EEOC Decision No. 84-3, 34 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1887 (Feb. 16, 1984). The
names of the parties involved are omitted because the statute bars identification of the par-
ties to proceedings before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
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her buttocks. After this occurred, the waitress left their table and asked a
male waiter to take her place; the customers then left without placing an
order. The waitress continued working and reported the incident to the
restaurant's owner when he later entered. He responded lightly and ex-
cused the conduct as drunken and typical for members of the alleged
harasser's ethnic group. Later that evening, the customers re-appeared at a
window, and the owner went out to talk to them. When the charging
party sought details of this conversation the next day, it became apparent
that the conversation had not been serious. This was confirmed several
nights later when one of the harassers appeared with two other men, and
they had dinner together with the owner. Although she had asked the
owner to have these men apologize, no apology was forthcoming, and as
she passed the harasser's table, she told him that he was disgusting. Two
days later, her employer questioned her about this comment. At that
time, she told him she found the behavior "humiliating, insulting, and
offensive" and recounted other incidents of harassment which she had
held back for fear of being fired if she had reported them. She also said
that this behavior exceeded what she could handle with the "good humor
required of a waitress," and asked that she not have to serve these custom-
ers again. When her employer said that she might have to be terminated,
she asked to have a witness present. In response to this request and the
disclosure that she had contacted an attorney, she was fired.174
The EEOC relied on its own guidelines in the discussion and deci-
sion of this case. Noting that the charging party's story was credible and
corroborated, the commission stated that no previous decision had ad-
dressed this issue, and in a footnote explained that research could disclose
no case law on point.'75 But noting that the guidelines do cover harass-
ment by a non-employee, they stated that the pivotal issues were whether
the employer "knows or should have known" about the conduct, whether
the employer took "immediate and appropriate corrective action," and
further noted that in third party cases, the Commission should consider
"the extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility"
which the employer might have over the harasser. 76 In this case, it is un-
disputed that the charging party informed her employer of the
harassment. Thus, the issue in this case was "whether it was within the
Respondent's control to take immediate and appropriate corrective action
174. Id. at 1888-90.
175. Id. at 1890 n.2.
176. Id. (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(1982)).
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and if so, whether the Respondent took such action."' These duties, the
Commission stated in a footnote, are part of the employer's affirmative
responsibility to provide a "working environment free from unlawful har-
,,178
assment ....
Because the harassing customer was a restaurant "regular" and the
owner had a friendly relationship with him, the Commission was per-
suaded that the owner was in a position to take corrective action. For
example, the Commission suggested that he could have informed the cus-
tomer that this type of behavior was not tolerated in his restaurant and
that he could have relieved the charging party of a duty to wait on this
customer. Since none of these measures or similar ones were undertaken,
the owner was liable for sexual harassment.179 Moreover, the employer was
also found liable for retaliating against the waitress for asserting her rights
under Tide VII.'°
The first reported judicial case, 8' Thoreson v. Penthouse Intl., Ltd., is
an egregious one.'82 Plaintiff Marjorie Thoreson was employed by
177. Id. at 1891.
178. Id. at 1891 n.3.
179. Id. at 1891.
180. Id. at 1892.
181. Rife v. Am. Amusement Arcades, Inc., No. C7-89-1562, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS 105
(Jan. 22, 1990) is slightly earlier, but it is an unpublished case. There, plaintiffs job was to
deliver stuffed animals to amusement arcades. Id. at *1. She had made an initial complaint
about customer harassment during the course of her deliveries, and was told she need not
enter a business where she felt "threatened." Id. at *1-2. Eventually, she quit her job and
filed for unemployment compensation benefits. Id. at *1. The issue in this case was
whether the plaintiff had adequately reported further harassment to her employer after her
initial complaint. Finding that she had failed to do so, and that her employer had made a
reasonable response to her first complaint, the court upheld the Commissioner's finding
that she had quit without good cause. Id at *3. It seems assumed in the text of the opinion
that such harassment, if proven, could be grounds for quitting with cause.
Two years later, Minnesota courts produced another unpublished decision on this is-
sue in State v. Tasks Unlimited, Inc., No. C8-92-981, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 1076 (Oct.
28, 1992). Here, an administrative law judge had determined that Sandra Klein, an em-
ployee of Tasks Unlimited, had established a case of harassment, and the employer had
appealed these findings to the court. Id. at *1. Klein alleged that her job as a customer liai-
son had subjected her to daily sexual harassment from customers over the eighteen-month
duration of her job. She also claimed that her supervisors had knowledge of this harass-
ment, and had failed to do anything about it. Id. at *2-*3. In affirming the ALJ's decision,
the court noted that the evidence supported a finding that Klein had told her employer
about the harassment and that internal company memos recognized the employer's own
deficiencies in handling her complaints. Further, it noted that the employer had not taken
any action to remedy the customer harassment. Id at *3-4.
182. 563 N.Y.Supp.2d 968 (1990).
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Penthouse and had a contract in which Penthouse promised to develop
her acting potential. She was also intimate with Penthouse owner
Robert Guccione. Although her dispute with Penthouse involved multi-
ple issues, the salient one for these purposes is that Guccione insisted the
plaintiff seduce and sleep with two business contacts that he deemed
important to the Penthouse empire. 83 In one case, this conduct lasted
over a period of 18 months. The business relationship between plaintiff
and Penthouse/Guccione deteriorated, and she was fired.
184
Although the court did not find for all of plaintiffs claims, it did
uphold her claim of sexual harassment, awarding $60,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages.185 The court
reasoned that an employer cannot use its power to impose sexual de-
mands, in this case with third parties, on employees as an "implicit
condition of continued employment., 18 6 In justifying the award of puni-
tive damages, the court noted that the state human rights laws are
extensions of basic notions of equality and human dignity, and that so-
ciety has an interest in upholding these principles through human rights
laws.' 87 Moreover, enforcement of these laws is designed to eliminate the
idea that there are "subclass[es]" of people whose rights can be ignored,
by denying them the ability to participate in the social order and charac-
terizing them as inferiors. Her employer's demands made her choose
between her personal liberty and her interest in continued employ-
ment.88 On this particular point, the court's language is particularly
instructive:
Unless eliminated, such conduct permits the employment
structure to be permeated by attitudes and relationships which
we have determined to be abhorrent. When female employees
such as plaintiff are allowed to be confronted by sexual
183. One might argue as to whether this case is better characterized as an employer quid pro
quo case, and indeed it might be. This case is discussed here because it represents an ex-
treme form of third party harassment, in which employees are required not only to be
sexually provocative to attract business, but are required to engage in sexual acts to further
business relationships. In this sense, the case may be more properly categorized as a type of
costume case, but its facts make it difficult to place in any one existing category of sexual
harassment.
184. Thoreson, 563 N.Y.Supp.2d at 970-71.
185. Id. at 971-72, 977.
186. Id. at 972. Although the focus of this article is federal law, this state case, especially at the
outset of this section, is instructive for providing a generalized theoretical justification for
enforcing anti-discrimination law against third party harassment.
187. Id at 973.
188. Id. at 975.
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coercion on the job, women as a group are relegated to a
subordinate status .... Defendant's attempt at sexual
extortion entailed precisely the type of insult and indignity
that the statute is designed to eradicate. Forcing plaintiff,
because she is female, to choose between her right to liberty
(bodily and personal integrity) and property (the right to earn
a living) is per se discriminatory. As employers who abused
their dominant status by forcing a female employee to chose
between compromising either her job or her personal dignity,
defendants are guilty of attempting to reduce plaintiff, because
of her sex, into a position of servitude.'89
The court deemed that the nature of plaintiffs employment, which
in part relied upon sexual exploitation, did not mitigate the error of de-
fendant's conduct. Accepting a job which exploited sexuality was not a
waiver of plaintiff's right to be free from sexual harassment. 90 Conclud-
ing, the court notes: "Defendants used the plaintiff in furtherance of
their business as if she were property owned by them. ' '
One of the most widely cited cases in this small corpus to first
squarely face the issue is Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corporation92 Plain-
tiff Carol Powell was hired as a "2 1" dealer in defendant's casino. Over
the course of thirteen months, she was reprimanded four times for
rudeness to customers, and was eventually terminated on this basis.
Powell contended, however, that she was fired because she complained
about hostile environment sexual harassment, and that her "rudeness"
was a response to the boorish, sexual comments and acts of customers.
The parties differences do not end there, however. Defendant con-
tended that it addressed plaintiffs concerns, while she alleged that her
complaints were ignored. 93 Like many employers in these cases, the Las
Vegas Hilton responded by filing a motion for summary judgment.
On the issue of sexual harassment, the court denied defendant's
motion. 94 Noting that this was a case of first impression, and grappling
with the paucity of precedent, the court deemed the costume cases un-
helpful. Thus, it turned first to the EEOC guidelines as a "body of
189. Id. at 976 (internal citation omitted).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 977.
192. 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D.Nev. 1992).
193. Id. at 1025-26.
194. Id. at 1031.
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experience and informed judgment" to which the court could turn for
guidance,'95 noting that the Supreme Court accepted these guidelines in
Meritor.' It also noted that a few lower courts, although not directly,
had also cited the guidelines on the third party harassment issue. The
court held that because Meritor guarantees employees a right to a har-
assment-free workplace, "in the appropriate case, an employer could be
liable" for harassment of employees by customers.'97 Thus established,
the issue was whether the plaintiff had presented a case that could go to
the jury. Here, the court employed the Ninth Circuit test for hostile
work environment sexual harassment, considering whether the behavior
was (1) sexual, (2) unwelcome, (3) severe or pervasive and (4) whether
the defendant responded appropriately. On the issue of the pervasive-
ness of the conduct, the court used the "reasonable victim" 
standard.198
Adoption of this standard led the court to reject defendant's argument
that the public nature of plaintiffs job, in a "fun" destination where
alcohol is frequently consumed, excused the behavior of the customers.
The court reasoned that to accept defendant's argument would be to
alter the status quo "so that, ironically, a previously sexually harassing
environment is itself a defense."' 99 On the issue of employer responsibil-
ity to remedy the problem, the court noted that Meritor did not answer
that issue, but that Ninth Circuit law holds employers liable for conduct
of which management-level employees knew, or in the "exercise of rea-
sonable care should have known." Where knowledge is demonstrated,
the employer must take action "reasonably calculated to end the har-
,,200
assment.
In Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc. ,20' another court also
faced the "novel" issue of third party harassment. In that case, the plain-
tiff, Rebecca Magnuson, worked as an employee of a company that
provided consultants under a service contract arrangement.0 2 Although
Magnuson's ostensible employer was Peak Technical Services, Fairfax
Motor Imports (a car dealer) and Volkswagen of America, Inc. were also
listed as defendants in this case, because of the amount of control they
195. Id. at 1027 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976)).
196. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,65 (1986).
197. Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1028.
198. This standard was developed in the Ninth Circuit case of Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 878 (1991).
199. Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1029.
200. Id. at 1029-30.
201. 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992).
202. The facts of this case are particularly significant in light of the rising number of "con-
tingent" or "contract" employees in this economy.
20021
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
had over her employment relationship. Peak arranged for Magnuson, a
car sales and marketing consultant, to provide field marketing services
for Fairfax, a Volkswagen dealership. Volkswagen provided her training,
and she was assigned to work with dealerships in the District of Colum-
bia area.
Under a new program, Magnuson began to work directly with one
dealership, Fairfax Volkswagen, although she had other job duties for
Volkswagen. Sometime into this relationship, Richard Blaylock became
the new general manager at Fairfax, and almost immediately began to
make repeated sexual advances towards Magnuson. When she contacted
her supervisors at both Peak and Volkswagen and asked for a reassign-
ment, the Peak supervisor told to put up with this behavior "for the sake
of Volkswagen" and that such behavior was normal in the car sales in-
dustry. Her Volkswagen supervisor was similarly unresponsive. After
further complaints, she was reassigned. But shortly after her reassign-
ment, a Peak employee called her to tell her that she had been
terminated. This was confirmed by a call to Volkswagen's offices, during
which she was told that she was "too cute" for the position and would
be harassed wherever she went."'
After concluding that all of the defendants were employers under
Title VII, the court then dealt with the more difficult issue of which of
the defendants were plaintiff's employer. To determine this, the court
resorted to a broadly construed control test, and also noted that in this
atypical case, it might be permissible under Title VII cases to find that
she was an employee of more than one employer.05 Thus, in response to
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court found that
Magnuson had raised a genuine issue on the matter of her employment
relationship with Volkswagen and Peak. Similarly, the court concluded
that it might be possible to deem Fairfax Volkswagen, the dealership, as
an agent of co-employer Volkswagen. °6
The court went on from here in its analysis of Magnuson's sexual
harassment claim. Noting that neither Peak nor Volkswagen had a di-
rect employment relationship with the harasser, the court raised the
novel question of whether an employer could be liable for acts of a non-
203. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 503-10.
204. Id. at 508.
205. Id. at 508-09 (citing Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 611
F. Supp. 344, 347-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(holding temporary services agency and com-
pany that contracted with temporary services agency to both be "employers" of a
temporary employee for purposes of Title VII) and other cases cited therein).
206. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 510.
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employee. In resolving this question, the court looked first to the EEOC
Guidelines and found that deference to these guidelines was appropri-
ate. 217 It also reviewed the EEOC decision in support of a doctrine of
third party harassment. 2°8 Applying the guidelines and the cases, the
court found that this situation could be analyzed similarly, and stated
the elements of her claim as follows: "Peak and Volkswagen may be held
liable for Blaylock's harassment of Magnuson if i) they knew of the har-
assment; and ii) they failed to take any corrective actions to remedy the
situation."209 Thus, plaintiffs case survived defendants' motions for
summary judgment.210
For the Kansas United States District Court, third party harass-
ment was also an issue of first impression in Otis v. Wyse. 21 Again, the
issue arose after the defendants in this case, Dr. Wyse and plaintiffs
employer, the Great Plains Health Alliance, presented motions for
summary judgment. Plaintiff had had a prior contact with Dr. Wyse as
a student, when he harassed her during her training as a nurse practitio-
ner. Later, she obtained a job with Great Plains, and Dr. Wyse's
behavior continued. For example, he left her a "bouquet" of condoms.
Plaintiff Sue Otis complained about this behavior on a regular basis.
After eighteen-months of complaints, Dr. Wyse, even though he was
not an employee of Great Plains, was asked to avoid contact with plain-
tiff and to cease behavior which would interfere with other's work.
Unfortunately, within several months Dr. Wyse resumed his harass-
ment. A new manager at the clinic told Otis that she would need to
207. Id. at 512-13.
208. Id. at 513. The court notes:
Although the EEOC did not specifically hold as such, the facts of this case
render it a hostile environment harassment case. No quid pro quo harass-
ment could be involved here because the nonemployee was not in the
position to grant or deny tangible job benefits. Instead, the employer's ac-
quiescence to, and refusal to take measures to correct, the customer's
harassment of the waitress clearly gave rise to an abusive and hostile work-
ing environment.
Id. at 513 n.10.
209. Id. at 513. The court modified its knowledge requirement in the next paragraph,
noting that with this circuit, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that the employer
had "actual or constructive knowledge" of a hostile working environment. Id
210. Id. at 514-15. The court also considered state law claims for breach of contract and
tortuous interference with contract. Id. at 515-17.
211. No. 93-2349-KHV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15172, at "1, *17 (D. Kan. Aug. 24,
1994).
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work with Wyse if she wanted a raise and to "get on with it." Plaintiff
ultimately resigned.212
Deeming this an issue about hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, the court looked to the EEOC Guidelines on this "emerging
issue." The court described the liability test for non-employee harass-
ment liability as "identical" to the test used for co-worker harassment
within the Tenth Circuit. Unlike the Magnuson court, this court felt
that the employment status of the harasser was irrelevant. Rather, the
issue in this type of case was whether the employer clearly knew of the
harassment and had the "ability to end the harassment but failed to do
so.21 This approach, the court opined, would be consistent with cur-
rent Title VII employer liability law in its circuit and it adopted the
EEOC Guidelines wholesale.1 4 In this case, because the employer did
know of the harassment, the issue boiled down to whether Great Plains'
actions were "prompt and reasonably calculated to end the harassment."
Concluding that the employer didn't act in this fashion, the court noted
that Great Plains was making this determination aware that Dr. Wyse
was not its employee, and that its ability to end the harassment might be
more limited. This doctrinal approach is consistent with the factors
listed in the guidelines, and it denied the summary judgment motion in
215order to leave these issues for a jury.
In another "first impression" case, plaintiff Maria Menchaca alleged
that a regular customer of the record store at which she was employed
harassed her and that nothing was done about it.216 At its most extreme,
the customer picked up plaintiff by the ankles and dangled her in the air
while her employer merely watched. 27 After reviewing basic sexual har-
assment law, the court was stumped by the "novel question" of
employer liability in this case. Relying on the EEOC Guidelines, the
Sage Realty case, and EEOC's own decisions, the court found in favor of
the plaintiffs argument that a customer's non-employee status did not
shield the employer from liability. As in prior cases, the court deter-
mined that the employer had been put on notice and that the salient
issue was the employer's ability to end the harassment. In denying de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, the court rejected defendant's
212. Id. at *1-6.
213. Id. at *17-18.
214. Id. at "18-19.
215. Id. at*20-22.
216. Menchacha v. Rose Records, Inc., No. 94 C 1376, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4149
(N.D. I11. March 31, 1995) at *1-4,*7.
217. Id. at "1-4, *7.
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argument that a customer was incapable of interfering with an em-
ployee's work, and that the customer's actions were "harmless" or just
"play."
218
Third party decisions after Ellerth and Faragher show no marked
change of direction. In Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., the company's policy
forbade customer harassment and established a procedure for employees
and managers to report customer harassment.1 9 One night, a repeat cus-
tomer went beyond his previous salacious comments and physically
accosted Lockard. Her manager required her to continue serving these
customers, one of whom then grabbed her breast and put his mouth on
it. She quit. The court, after determining who was the actionable em-
ployer given the franchise structure of the business, found that the
harassment was actionable, using the co-worker standard of liability and
upheld the jury verdict in her favor.
One last case raises potential questions about liability when it
comes to the growing use of contract or contingent employees in the
workforce. In this case, the plaintiff was a home health care aide whom
an employment agency contracted out to a home health care concern.
On one of her jobs, plaintiff alleged that the son of a patient harassed
her. Responsibility for problems at the workplace was apparently shared
by both the placement agency and the health care concern, and the
plaintiff had a documented record of work problems. Here, the court
ruled for the defendant, distinguishing it from Sage Realty Corp., by stat-
ing that the employer had not knowingly put the employee at risk and
had responded appropriately to her complaint.221
3. The Literature: While there are dozens of articles on traditional
forms of sexual harassment, almost nothing has been written about third
party sexual harassment. Even in the leading 82 4 -page treatise,
harassment by non-employees garners only five pages.222 Although it is
unusual in a law journal article to discuss other articles at any great
218. Id. at*5-12.
219. Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1066 (10th Cir. 1998).
220. Id. at 1067-77. Although not containing much of a discussion, another district court
ruled for a plaintiff complaining of third party harassment in response to defendant's
motion for summary judgment denying liability. Oliver v. Sheraton Tunica Corp.,
No. 3:98cv203-D-A, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3147 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 7, 2000).
221. Hylton v. Norrell Health Care of New York, 53 F. Supp. 2d 613, 613-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
222. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 3, at 248-52 (spending two pages on the costume
cases, and one paragraph each on harassment by independent contractors, customers,
consultants and vendors).
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length, because of the paucity of any legal materials in this area, the few
that exist have undue influence.
The earliest article appeared in 1983.223 Beginning his fourteen-
page article by identifying non-employee harassment of female employ-
ees as an unsettled issue, the author writes that these cases "raise[] the
question of the ultimate limits of employer responsibility" in the doc-
trinal law of sexual harassment.224 Because of the time at which the
article came out, the author focused on the costume cases to develop a
theory of employer liability. The author opined that the cases, although
decided correctly, provided thin articulation of principles that would
guide courts in the future. Continuing, he identifies employer knowl-
edge as the first issue in these cases, and analogizes it to the employer's
need to police co-worker conduct as part of their duty to maintain a
harassment-free workplace.225 After concluding that the same standard
that applies to co-employee harassment, i.e., knows or should have
known, should apply in non-employee cases, he noted that once the
employer knows, it must act to end the harassment for to do otherwise
is to approve of or tolerate the harassment. He added, however, that
remedies that are reasonable in non-employee cases may differ from
those in supervisor or co-worker cases.226 Harm to the harassed employee
is identified as a second obstacle in these cases; that is, does the harass-
ment affect the employees "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment?" He concludes that non-employee harassment is yet an-
other variation of hostile environment harassment, and that the
complaining employee need not show tangible job loss. 227 As a result of
this analysis, the author adopts the following prima facie test:
1. The employer knew (or should have known) of the har-
assment;
2. The employer failed to take reasonable measures to pre-
vent or remedy the harassment; and
223. See Allegretti, supra note 3.
224. Id. at 98-99.
225. Id. at 100-01.
226. Id. at 101.
227. Id. at 102-04. The Meritor and Harris decisions, issued after this article, make this
consideration far less problematic. See Harris, 510 U.S. 17; Meritor, 477 U.S. 57.
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The harassment affected the employee's terms or condi-
tions of employment, because it was sufficiently pervasive
and severe to create an offensive working environment.1
28
The author concluded by reviewing the aptness of the two defenses
that had been used in the costume cases: reasonable dress codes and the
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, and concludes, as
have the courts, that these are not ways to justify harassment. 29 In a
concluding line, the author opines that the "same basic approach"
should be used in cases not involving sexually provocative dress.230
A more considered treatment of the subject appeared roughly ten
years later.231 Beginning their article by recognizing that non-employee
harassment may have an even greater impact on employees than co-
employee harassment, the authors' goal was to develop principles by
which future courts might decide these cases, and policies by which em-
ployers could prevent them. 32 In this article, the authors also reviewed
the costume cases, but concluded that they were not helpful, because
they did not address the more typical forms of non-employee harass-
ment. Thus, they saw their task as looking at analogous law and dicta to
determine how the courts should resolve these cases. 233 After pointing
out that the costume cases were decided before Meritor, the authors sug-
gest that the hostile environment theory developed in Meritor also
describes the situation of an employee harassed by a non-employee:
For example, if a female sales representative were subjected to
highly objectionable sexual conduct in a pervasive and severe
manner by one of her customers, this would significantly alter
the terms and conditions of her work. As a result, she might be
reluctant to approach her harassing customer, who she now
finds reprehensible. This would create a hostile environment
228. Allegretti, supra note 3, at 104. The author notes that the EEOC Guidelines use the
same approach, but notes those guidelines call for the employer to undertake "imme-
diate and appropriate corrective action" once it learns of the non-employee
harassment. Id. at 104-05.
229. Id. at 105-09.
230. Id. at 109.
231. Aalberts & Seidman, Non-Employees, supra note 3. The authors produced two ver-
sions of this article. The one discussed here is the law review article cited in note 3.
They also produced a version of this article for an employee relations journal for a
non-legal audience that focused mainly on how to craft employer policies to avoid li-
ability for non-employee harassment.
232. Id. at 451.
233. Id. at 453-54.
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case because her customer's place of business is a part of her
workplace. Moreover, if she were to react by ceasing any deal-
ings with the customer, she would lose a valuable account
which would'affect her income and advancement.234
The doctrinal problem with this scenario, as the authors recog-
nized, is that Title VII does not specifically address the situation of non-
employee harassment, assuming rather that the employer is the sole
source of discrimination in the workplace.
In justifying court censure of non-employee harassment, the au-
thors argued that the courts can look to the EEOC Guidelines and dicta
in four cases, which suggest that there is a cause of action for non-
employee harassment. 215 And, they generally dismiss the applicability of
defenses resting on dress codes or a BFOQ.236
At the time these authors wrote, the courts had not directly decided
any third party sexual harassment cases, therefore the authors derived
their standards by looking at those hostile environment cases which they
deemed most apt. The authors note that although the hostile environ-
ment cases originally developed from cases involving racial and ethnic
harassment, they expanded the elements that a complainant must prove.
Additionally, in the case of Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth Circuit intro-
duced the "reasonable woman" standard which asks courts and juries to
evaluate whether a "reasonable woman" would consider alleged hostile
environment to be sufficiently severe as to alter the work environ-
ment.237 Aalberts and Seidman spend considerable time analyzing the
effects of this case on a non-employee claim. 2 ' Following much of the
reasoning of the Ellison case itself, the authors argue that this standard
would be preferable because it is not referenced to the status quo and it
is sympathetic to the traditionally overlooked "experiences of
234. Id. at 456.
235. Id. at 456-458 (citing cases Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d
380 (5th Cit. 1987)(implying non-employee harassment is actionable, citing the
EEOC guidelines); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (adding that "even
strangers to the workplace" can cause sexual harassment); Whitaker v. Carney, 778
F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 1985)(noting in dicta that an employer has a duty to act
against non-employees for harassment of its employees); Moffett v. Gene B. Glick
Co., 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985)(stating that the workplace can be rendered
offensive by supervisors, co-workers or strangers to the workplace). Id., respectively,
at nn. 70, 73, 75 and 77.
236. Aalberts & Seidman, Non-Employees, supra note 3, at 458-61.
237. 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cit. 1991).
238. Aalberts & Seidman, Non-Employees, supra note 3, at 464-66.
THE CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS RIGHT
women." 239 The standard does not accommodate the reactions of a hy-
per-sensitive victim, but does hold defendant's liable for non-intentional
240
conduct on the part of the harasser.
Finally, before outlining their proposed prima facie case, the au-
thors review the totality of the circumstances test that is used in the
1985 EEOC Guidelines and directs the court to consider both the na-
ture of the behavior and the context in which it occurred. 21 This
portion of the article is inspired by dicta in Meritor to the effect that the
plaintiffs dress and speech are "obviously relevant."242 Unlike rape cases
where this type of evidence is often considered irrelevant, the authors
conclude that the Supreme Court was correct because "the circum-
stances surrounding certain jobs cannot be realistically ignored."
2 1
After disposing of these considerations, the authors announced the
following model or set of factors for judging third party harassment:
1. The reasonable woman perspective should be adopted.
2. The conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to
alter working conditions.
3. The harasser's intent is irrelevant.
4. The totality of the circumstances must be considered, al-
though a woman's consent to work in a "risky"
environment is not a waiver of her Title VII rights.
5. The employer will be liable if it knew or should have
known of the conduct, but fails to take prompt, remedial
244
action.
Drawing on the Ellison principles, the authors augment their model
by dividing cases into three types depending upon the work the woman
does: high-risk, medium-risk, and low-risk. In these sections, the au-
thors attempt to describe the extent of an employer's liability based
upon what a woman might expect upon entering into one of these types
of occupations. For example, they reasoned that a topless female
239. Id. at 466.
240. Id. at 466.
241. Id. at 466.
242. 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
243. Aalberts & Seidman, Non-Employees, supra note 3, at 467. In a footnote, the authors
contrast the sales clerk at a bookstore to the cocktail waitress, pointing out that in
these differing contexts, the same allegedly harassing behavior may be judged differ-
ently.
244. Id. at 468-70.
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dancer245 should expect stares that a woman in a bookstore would not.
The gist of this idea is that employees in certain occupations should tol-
erate a greater or lesser degree of harassment, i.e., it should be
actionable, depending upon their employment. Thus, at the other ex-
treme, the employer of the bookstore clerk should be the "most
protective and respond to even mild provocation" although a worker in
this environment should expect fewer harassing incidents. 4 The authors
end by proposing some ideas for employers drafting policies to antici-
pate third party cases.
A final article focused on the problem of attorney-client
harassment. Although increasing scrutiny has been brought to bear on
attorneys who harass clients, this article turns the table.2 Narrowly
targeted, the article outlines the development of sexual harassment
doctrine,248 and provides background about the extent of the problem.249
Finally, after outlining the law that exists on third party harassment,250
the authors argue that the incentive structure that is in place to curtail
co-employee or supervisor harassment does not exist for third party
harassment, and that the power imbalance that typifies traditional
sexual harassment lies "at the root of' this form of harassment as well.
For example, the authors argue that employer acquiescence in third
party behavior gives the harasser additional power and is an extension of
the "same power dynamic that fosters employee-employee sexual
harassment. ''212 Drawing on facets of the attorney-client relationship, the
authors identify various points for which the typical assumption of the
"powerful" lawyer does not hold true, especially where a client's
245. A recent article depicts the employment situation of the typical dancer. Most dancers
are hired as independent contractors in an effort to limit a variety of duties that em-
ployers owe to employees and escape liability under statutes such as Title VII. Noting
that American law has been traditionally reluctant to deal with the legal realities of
sex work, Fischer argues that nude dancers should be treated as employees in order to
limit the abuse of these women as a result of their employers manipulation of the le-
gal system. Carrie Benson Fischer, Employee Rights in Sex Work: The Struggle for
Dancers'Rights as Employees, 14 LAw & INEQ. 521 (1996).
246. Aalberts & Seidman, Non-Employees, supra note 3, at 470-71. It was the contrast
between the bookstore clerk and the topless dancer that led to my exploration of the
library as a "low-risk" workplace.
247. Honigsberg et al., supra note 3, at 715.
248. Id. at 717-19.
249. Id. at 719-20.
250. Id. at 720-23.
251. Id. at 728. This argument comes after a review of existing case law on sexual harass-
ment.
252. Id. at 732.
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decisions may directly affect an attorney's career.2" Because the authors'
are writing to encourage law firms to develop policies to address third
party harassment, the authors do not develop a model of a prima facie
case of third party harassment.
4. Summary: The third party cases illustrate a major difference from
the now classic supervisor or co-worker harassment cases. In the third
party cases presented, the facts demonstrate that sex is used purpose-
fully, tacitly or by acquiescence, to advance business interests. In the
supervisor or co-worker cases, harassment detracts from business pur-
poses and the harassment is for the personal, non-business related
benefit of the perpetrator. Thus, a supervisor or co-worker will frustrate
the legitimate business purposes of its employer. On the other hand,
employers, tacitly or openly, may find that encouraging an atmosphere
in which third party harassment is acceptable, or the norm, may further
their business interests.
Sexual harassment is firmly placed in the Title VII firmament, but
what is puzzling is the lack of cases attacking third party harassment,
especially to the extent that it has been authorized in the EEOC Guide-
lines. This lacunae raises at least two questions:
a. As a matter of law and policy should third party harass-
ment be actionable?
b. If it is actionable, what should be the elements of a prima
facie case?
III. ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION
A. Should Third Party Harassment Be Actionable?
Third party harassment definitely takes place, perhaps as frequently
as supervisor or co-employee harassment. It may well be that as
consciousness of sexual harassment has risen, and employers have sought
to educate their workforce, that third party harassment may be the last
major form of unregulated sexual harassment.254 The courts have acted
in only a few cases. The purpose of this part of the article is to make the
case for consistently recognizing a Title VII cause of action for third
253. Id. at 732-34.
254. For an article suggesting another basis for liability, see Christopher M. O'Connor,
Comment, Stop Harassing Her or We'll Both Sue: Bystander Injury Sexual Harassment,
50 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 501 (1999).
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party harassment. To make this case, scholarship in the areas of feminist
jurisprudence, sociology and psychology of work, and corporate law will
be examined. Finally, an argument will be made that this cause of action
is consistent with prevailing Title VII law.
In the course of this analysis, several themes emerge. First, I will
address the question of silence; one of the most puzzling things about
this phenomenon has been the lack of recognition from the courts in
the face of its commonality. Second, many of these sources provide
valuable insights about the harm that accrues as a result of any form of
sexual harassment. Additionally, some of these areas of scholarship con-
tribute further to our understanding of why sexual harassment occurs,
and suggest possible avenues of both research inquiry and doctrinal evo-
lution.
1. Feminist Jurisprudence: Over the last several decades, as women
have entered the profession, a body of scholarship has emerged that is
collectively called feminist jurisprudence. Although going under one
name, this scholarship is composed of diverse points of view, and cer-
tainly cannot be considered a monolithic approach to legal issues.
Scholars in this area differ, for example, on whether issues that concern
women are best addressed from a difference point of view, or an equality
point of view. The point here, however, is not to present an exhaustive
overview of this scholarship, but rather to glean insights from classic
samples of work in this area. The bottom line that emerges from much
of this scholarship is that the courts, for a variety of reasons, do not take
"women's issues" seriously, and that this "silence" seriously harms the
ability of any woman to participate freely and without restriction in the
American economy and workforce.
a. Silence. One of the articles that speaks in a sustained fashion to
the silence of the courts in the face of women's experiences is authored
by Wendy Pollack." Making liberal use of quotations from working
women, Pollack regards conversations among women as one of the salu-
tory benefits of the early women's movement. Women realized that the
experiences that they had at work shared common features, rather than216
being private and isolated occurrences. Citing Catharine
257MacKinnon, Pollack's thesis is that because courts have refused or
255. Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1990).
256. Id. at 39.
257. Id. at 42-43, in which she cites Catharine MacKinnon:
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denied women's experiences, current decisions "perpetuate both the op-
pression of women and culturally imposed sex roles.2,2 After presenting
a brief doctrinal history, Pollack predicts that with the promulgation of
the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment,259 women will have diffi-
culty trying to fit their experience of harassment into the legal
framework of the Guidelines. She concluded, "[w]omen have named
sexual harassment, but have lost control of the context of its defini-
tion., 260 The end result of this loss in translating a norm into the law is
that women are not to be trusted nor taken seriously, their injuries are
not serious, and the actions of the men who perpetrate harassment are
not taken seriously.
2 1
Other condemnations abound in the literature. For example, Kath-
ryn Abrams notes that while the courts have recognized claims for
hostile environment discrimination since 1981, recent decisions show
some confusion about the doctrine and discomfort with its "transforma-
tive potential., 262 For example, she cites several court opinions which
Women's lived-through experience, in as whole and truthful a fashion as
can be approximated at this point, should begin to provide the starting
point and context out of which is constructed the narrower forms of abuse
that will be made illegal on their behalf. Now that a few women have the
tools to address the legal system on its own terms, the law can begin to ad-
dress women's experience on women's own terms.
MAcKINNON, supra note 6, at 26.
258. Pollack, supra note 255, at 43-44.
259. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2000).
260. Pollack, supra note 255, at 48.
261. Id. at 69. This observation is followed by an analysis of several cases which serve to
prove her points.
262. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. Rav. 1183, 1198-99 (1989). For other articles which raise the issue of
the courts' silence on expanding or understanding notions of sexual harassment, see
also Sarah E. Burns, Evidence of A Sexually Hostile Workplace: What Is It and How
Should It Be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 357, 359 (1994)(noting that courts which had adopted stricter sexual
harassment standards had done so because of "historic bias, trivialized discrimination,
or underestimated the plaintiffs injury by evaluating offensive conduct out of the
context in which it occurred"); Kenneth L. Pollack, Comment Introduction to Special
Project: Current Issues in Sexual Harassment Law, 48 VAND. L. Rxv. 1009, 1012-13,
1015 (1995) ("[c]ase law underscores the societal tensions inherent in imposing legal
sanctions in sensitive areas of human conduct"; and attributes court reluctance on
this to concerns about the impact on workplace behavior and the regulation of
human behavior. He also notes that the split in courts is attributable to a split in
perspectives about sexual harassment: with one group calling for a workplace
absolutely free of harassment, and another group resistant to government regulation
of behavior and believing such a task to be either "impossible or misguided"); Glen
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both trivialize the type of harm, and suggest that the boundary of sexual
harassment doctrine is marked by a belief that the plaintiffs are com-
plaining only about "rude" or "vulgar" behavior rather than behavior
which limits their employment opportunities."' She ascribes these views
to the courts' failure to take account of the perspectives of women, and
because many men regard this conduct differently than women. And
thus, she asserts that because "most judges are men," they see workplace
harassment as "harmless amusement" which women should expect as
they enter the workplace."'
Other writers support Abrams, noting that the courts are hesitant
to "believe women's accounts" and that this translates into a strict and
narrow application of existing legal standards."' But altering this strict
application of the law, observes Susan Estrich, will require more than
"doctrinal manipulation" because the law "rests [on] a set of assump-
tions and attitudes about women and work that support both the rules
and results of which I am most critical." '266 To the extent that Estrich
links the realm of law creation with these structures outside of the law,
Allen Staszewski, Comment, Using Agency Principlesfor Guidance in Finding Employer
Liability For a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L.
REv. 1057, 1098 (1995) (citing sources at notes 244-247 which maintain that the
courts and rules "reveal a general distrust of women").
263. Abrams, supra note 262, at 1199-1201.
264. Id. at 1202-03. In succeeding pages, Abrams argues that courts must see another
perspective, recognizing both the attitudes women have towards their place at work,
and their attitudes about sex, although she acknowledges there will be substantial
variations among individuals. Thus, courts must alter the way they adjudicate sexual
harassment claims. Id. at 1203-15. Such arguments also form the basis for proposing
the "reasonable woman test" for sexual harassment cases. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Abrams' arguments were central to the Ellison analysis.
In a subsequent article, however, Abrams qualified her endorsement of the "reason-
able woman test" arguing that it relies on an essentialism that ignores the variations
in women's experiences, and recommends that further empirical research is needed in
this area. Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologist, and Reasonable
Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1021 (1992).
265. Jeanne-Marie Bates, Feminist Methodology: Influencing Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims, 15 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 143, 143 n.4 (1993-1994), citing
Christine A. Littleton, Women 's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspective
on the Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 27. Providing the
following parenthetical: "explaining that 'believing women's accounts' means
examining the range of accounts that women give of their gender-specific injuries and
asking what it would mean for the legal system if we took all these accounts
seriously." Bates, supra. Her article is focused on discussions of cases, such as Ellison
V. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, which have incorporated feminist insights.
266. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. Rav. 813, 859 (1991).
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she points to the ways in which courts define what behavior is trivial or
"de minimis" and therefore not worthy of redress. She argues that the
courts have "wrongly looked to social interaction outside the workplace
as the standard, ignoring not only the 'captive audience' nature of the
employment context but also the fact that 'society' hardly reflects a
normative standard which women have had an equal role in 
shaping., 267
This is especially true in the third party contexts described in this article.
Writers in areas outside of sexual harassment have also noticed this
"silence." For example, Vicki Schultz makes a sustained argument that
in a thorough analysis of the workplace sex segregation cases, "there has
been a continuing (if not always conscious) sexism in the way working
women have been envisioned within the law. ' 268 After describing how
cases based on sex discrimination have departed from the analysis more
typically found in race cases in which the courts saw it as their mission
to dismantle workplace racial discrimination, Schultz states that the
courts have never had this mission in sex discrimination cases. She con-
siders this a testimonial to the degree to which judges have accepted the
dominant societal view of women as marginal workers. This view is
linked to the cultural image of women as beings formed in and for the
private domestic sphere, rather than actors shaped like their male coun-
terparts by and for the public world of wage work.269
In exploring how courts explain job segregation, Schultz states that
a consequence of the courts' impoverished notions of how women
choose jobs and careers means that they "assume away the major
problem that (T)itle VII should be addressing: the organization of work
structures and workplace cultures." 70 But not only does this mean that
courts misunderstand how organizations work, for in Schultz's opinion,
courts fail to understand how employers socially construe gender. And
this, in turn, amplifies a false belief that the sexes are significantly
different. "There is no room for the possibility that women are different
from men in certain respects, yet still aspire to the same types of
work., 271 Schultz posits that rather than having predetermined sex-based
work aspirations, or being forced into jobs by employers, a woman's job
267. Id. at 843. Estrich cites Rabidue v. Osceloa Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-22 (6th
Cir. 1986) as an example of her point.
268. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
103 HARV. L. Rav. 1749, 1754 (1990).
269. Id. at 1770-71.
270. Id. at 1800.
271. Id. at 1805.
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experience, i.e. her experience of the workplace organization and
culture, can shape her choice, her job, or her career aspirations.
She argues that if we realize that the employer's structural condi-
tions inhibit women's choices and aspirations in the workplace, rather
than pre-work social forces beyond the reach of law, the law has some-
thing to do: change the structure. Legal inaction has "perpetuated the
status quo of sex segregation by refusing to acknowledge its own power
to dismantle it."272 This means that there are facts for the courts to con-
sider, i.e. the way in which any particular employer has structured its
workplace and the way in which that structure is a barrier to the fullest
utilization of women's talents aprd aspirations. Judges need to realize the
way in which their decisions are "implicated in creating women's work
preferences.""'
Overlapping with observations made about the courts' regard for
workplace harassment, similar arguments are made by writers in the area
of street harassment. Cynthia Grant Bowman starts her article by stat-
ing: "A recurrent theme of feminist jurisprudence is that the law fails to
take seriously events which affect women's lives., 274 She also notes this
silence extends beyond the law and into the social sciences. Using the
words of Robin West, she points out that the entire phenomenon of
street harassment is thus "entirely invisible to the state. , 27' At this point,
most of the documentation of street harassment appears in the popular
press and media. She quotes the wry comments of Catharine
MacKinnon: "[S]cholars who look down upon such popular journalistic
forays into policy research (especially by 'women's magazines') should
ask themselves why Redbook noticed sexual harassment before they
did. ' 276 After completing her account of the reality of street harassment
and the harm it causes, Bowman ponders whether the near-universality
of such behavior means that it is accepted as "normal" and thus invisible
as both a social issue and legal problem.277
272. Id. at 1816.
273. Id. at 1842.
274. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women,
106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 518 (1993).
275. Id. at 522 (quoting Robin West, Pornography as a Legal Text, in FOR ADULT USERS
ONLY: THE DILEMMA OF VIOLENT PORNOGRAPHY 108, 111 (Susan Gubar & Joan
Hoff, eds., 1989)).
276. Bowman, supra note 274, at 523 n.23 (citing MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 248 n.1).
277. Id. at 534.
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Author Tiffanie Heben, like Bowman, argues that street harass-
ment is a problem that deserves a legal solution.2 " The first step, she
suggests, is that women must "name" this behavior before they can
complain about it in any formal sense, acknowledging that the legal sys-
tem currently does not recognize street harassment as a wrong.
279 Before
proposing her own legal remedy for street harassment, Heben acknowl-
edges that silence on this issue may be a social and legal comment that
this type of behavior is private and thus beyond the realm of, and inap-
propriate for, legal regulation because it would overly interfere in
citizen's private lives.280 Her account of the legal silence, then, is some-
what at odds with Bowman's, suggesting that there has been an active
social and legal decision rather than a passive one.
Finally, Anita Bernstein provides a cross-cultural account of the
way in which legal systems respond to sexual harassment.
8 1 Although
her article focuses on comparing American and European responses to
sexual harassment, Bernstein early on suggests that one lesson American
feminists can learn from American silence is that they need to demon-
strate how "a problem they have identified extends beyond the feminist
agenda. 28 2 While the downside of this strategy might be to risk control
over doctrinal development, it would also, she argues, garner new sup-
porters. One portion of Bernstein's article describes the barriers that
American plaintiffs face when bringing sexual harassment lawsuits. Be-
fore beginning her analysis she summarizes the problems as follows:
"locating and convincing a lawyer, refuting archaic prejudices, and if she
prevails, extracting meaningful damages from a legal system that does
not often regard her injury as important., 284 There is, then, a "great gap"
between the injuries that women perceive and those that the courts are
prepared to redress.285
b. Harm. One of the major contributions of feminist jurispru-
dence, in breaking the silence, has been to reveal the way in which
women are harmed in either the public or private sphere. What this
scholarship reveals is that sexual harassment is "part of a continuum of
278. Tiffanie Heben, A Radical Reshaping of the Law: Interpreting and Remedying Street
Harassment, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 183 (1994).
279. Id. at 185-86.
280. Id. at 205.
281. Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1227 (1994).
282. Id. at 1231.
283. Id
284. Id. at 1267.
285. Id. at 1271.
20021
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER '- LAW
violence against women. ""' Moreover, sexual harassment occurs in a
number of places, for example, in prisons, housing and the armed
forces."' Much of the documentation of the ways in which harassment
harms women focuses on their perceptions, in studies or other sources.
Unfortunately, third party harassment as a discrete phenomenon has not
been addressed in either legal literature or in the social sciences. How-
ever, there is no reason to suppose that the harm incurred from third
party harassment is any different than that from traditional workplace
harassment. Additionally, some scholarship on "street harassment" also
provides insights on how third party harassment might harm women.
The assumption in drawing on these sources is that, viewed from a per-
spective of harm, third party harassment can partake of both the harms
women experience when they are harassed at the workplace, as well as
the harms they experience when they are out in public in their non-
work capacity. In this sense, third party harassment occupies something
of a midpoint on a continuum that ranges from harassment in solely a
workplace setting to harassment that happens in public, unrelated to
one's employment. This section of the article will attempt to survey and
depict the ways in which harassment affects women.
One of the first things the literature reveals is that sexual harass-
ment is not an isolated phenomenon. It often affects, or is affected by,
other structures in the workplace. One of the focuses of feminist juris-
prudence has been sex segregation at work, i.e. the practice which has
led to lower wages for women and a sense of separate men's and
women's labor markets or jobs. In an early article, Nadine Taub, stated
that attitudes play an important role in maintaining sex segregated
workplaces.288 These attitudes, she says, "reflect an expectation that a
woman's work force participation is secondary to, and contingent upon,
family considerations." '289 One of the attitudes that Taub identifies as
286. DEBORAH L. SIEGEL, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT: RESEARCH & RESOURCES 1 (1992) (citing Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights
As Human Rights: Towards a Re- Vision ofHuman Rights, in Gender Violence: A De-
velopment and Human Rights Issue 3 (Center for Women's Global Leadership,
1991); Lois Copeland & Leslie R. Wolfe, Center for Women's Policy Studies, Vio-
lence Against Women As Bias Motivated Hate Crime: Defining the Issues (1991).
The authors also state that sexual harassment is about power, not sex.
287. Rachael A. Hetherington & Barbara Childs Wallace, Recent Developments in Sexual
Harassment Law, 13 Miss. C. L. REv. 37, 43 nn.27-29 (fall 1992).
288. Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Em-
ployment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REv. 345, 352 (1980).
289. Id.
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harming women and contributing to this perception, is their characteri-
zation as sexual objects. In a noteworthy passage, she writes:
Sexual references, as well as explicit demands for sexual coop-
eration, convey the message that a woman is a sexual object
before she is a contributing worker, and whether it is con-
sciously undertaken or not, such behavior serves to reinforce
women's sexual role. Indeed, such behavior is probably the
quintessential expression of stereotypic role expectations. Like
other expressions of stereotypic expectations occurring at the
work place, it is dysfunctional in two respects. Whether or not
perceived as flattering by women, sexual advances remind
women of a societal-imposed incongruity between their role as
worker and as woman. By thus arousing role conflict in
women, advances interfere with their performance. By under-
scoring their sexual identity in the eyes of male supervisors,
sexual advances make it less likely that women will be viewed
as persons capable of performing a demanding task, and con-
sequently, less likely that they will have the opportunity to try
to do so.2O
Taub's point is useful. It documents the way in which sexual har-
assment is a product of stereotypes of women, and leads to further
economic segregation. Most judges do not understand the ways in
which harassment as a form of stereotyping "keeps women in their
place." '291 What is needed is a richer doctrinal analysis of the structural
consequences of stereotyping, sex segregation and any form of sexual
harassment.
Gillian K. Hadfield, echoing Taub, argues that although sexual212
harassment is the source of multiple harms to women, the traditional
list of harms does not provide a solid enough basis for Title VII doctrine
as currently interpreted. Rather, she argues that the strongest bias for
analyzing the harms perpetuated by sexual harassment is to look at the
economic impact of the behavior at the macroeconomic level. She notes,
by way of example, that sexual harassment is "a factor in the
290. Id. at 361.
291. Id. at 362.
292. Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Testfrr Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L.
Rav. 1151, 1169-70 & nn.76-80 (Oct. 1995). The harms she lists are as follows:
psychological harm, interference with a woman's job, perpetuation of stereotypes,
diminished self-esteem, and the perpetuation or reinforcement of male dominance in
the workplace.
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perpetuation of occupational segregation., 293 This is particularly true for
women attempting to enter traditionally male fields.294 Customer or
client harassment exacerbates this segregation by adding yet more
incidents that limit women's job choices.
Hadfield's contribution in tying sexual harassment to occupational
segregation is to allow us to see that current doctrine erroneously ties
sexual harassment only to psychological harm, rather than economic
harm. This causes the court, mistakenly in her opinion, to delve into
inquiries about the sufficiency of the psychological harm. Ultimately,
she argues, this creates a false dichotomy, begun in Meritor, between
quid pro quo economic harm and hostile environment non-economic
psychological harm.295 She concludes:
By analyzing the hostile environment case as one of discrimi-
nation in the intangible psychological benefits of employment,
courts have missed the essential violation of Title VII that the
harassment perpetuates-the introduction of a discriminatory
factor into women's economic choices. Sex-based harassment is
a cost of employment that women alone bear, and this cost
can be expected to lead women, conceived of as rational ac-
tors, to make employment decisions that differ from those
made by men in otherwise similar circumstances. The flaw in
the current analysis of sex-based harassment is that it finds dis-
crimination simply in the differential cost imposed upon men
and women. Closer analysis goes a step further to see that the
discrimination worked by sex-based harassment stems from
the rational response of female employees to harassment.
Once the focus is shifted to the impact of harassment on
women's employment decisions, it is plain that sex-based har-
assment, even if not of the quid pro quo variety, is economic
discrimination. Women's employment decisions, and conse-
quently their economic status, are distorted by the practice of
harassment in ways that men's employment decisions and eco-
nomic status are not. Since harassment is discrimination that
goes to the core of Title VII's concern with equal employment
opportunity, there is no basis for a legal standard that requires
293. Id. at 1171.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1168.
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a case-by-case normative assessment of whether harassment is
"hostile" or "abusive" enough to constitute an injury. Title VII
decrees the injury: discrimination. The only inquiry that har-
assment law should make is whether alleged harassment
introduces a distortion into the employment choices women
make *296
In succeeding pages, Hadfield demonstrates the ways in which har-
assment contributes to horizontal and vertical segregation and
accompanying wage depression. 297 This leads her, ultimately, to propose
the following test, built on the normative principle of non-
discrimination rather than efficiency:298 "Non-job-related sex-based
conduct constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII if a ra-
tional woman would alter her workplace behavior to her detriment in
order to eliminate the risk of such conduct if she could do so
costlessly. ' ,299 Third party harassment is yet another source of economic
harm beyond the harm occasioned by supervisor and co-worker harass-
ment.
Another valuable insight about the harms caused by sexual harass-
ment comes from recent work on street harassment. Street harassment
has been defined as occurring when an unfamiliar man approaches a
woman in public and intrudes (or attempts to intrude) upon a woman's
attention in a way that is unwelcome, by using language or behavior
that is sexual in its content. 00 This conduct differs from sexual harass-
ment in the sense that the "sexual" in sexual harassment is there not to
note the sexual content of the harassment, but rather to describe the
target of the behavior. Nonetheless, these forms of harassment are simi-
lar in that a male, by acting in a fashion that is unwelcome to a woman,
may limit her behavior or choices.
Using the term "informal ghettoization," Bowman points out that
street harassment can also lead to segregation of women.01 Quoting
John Locke, she points out how the legal system's failure to recognize
296. Id. at 1168-69 (citations omitted).
297. Id. at 1171-75.
298. Id. at 1175.
299. Id. at 1180. She also proposes the following alternate formulation of her test: "Non-
job-related sex-based conduct constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII
if a rational woman's choice between two jobs offering her substantially equivalent
benefits would be influenced by the fact that such conduct is present in one job but
not the other." Id. at 1180-81.
300. Bowman, supra note 274, at 575. See also Heben, supra note 278, at 186.
301. Bowman, supra note 274, at 520.
2002]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
street harassment interferes with women's liberty, in the sense of free-
dom from restraint, by reducing the geographical and physical mobility
and reminding them of "their place" at home and hearth." 2 She adds,
later, that this form of behavior is a deviation from our general norm of
civil inattention, and marks women as "open persons" with whom one
is free to feel familiar, and that this intrusion is an invasion of women's
privacy.03
Her comments here are quite apt for considering the effects of
third party harassment for, most typically, service and retail employees.
While these employees are "open" to strangers in the sense that they are
there to assist members of the public with business transactions or other
services, their openness is limited. When a stranger "hits" on a store
clerk or librarian, they are transgressing the limits of that employee's
role, and reminding them that they are sexual objects who may have no
place in that setting. As she concludes, such behavior tells "women [that
they] belong only in the world of the private.""3 4 Bowman is concerned
about the ways in which street harassment limits women's freedom and
their equality as citizens, "leaving them in a Hobbesian wilderness men
do not share."0 5 That same point can be analogized to third party har-
assment by the way in which customers or clients indicate that women
are not considered workers nor do they have full employment opportu-
nities.
Another study that Bowman draws on suggests that street harass-
ment, and analogously third party sexual harassment, can hurt women.
One study that Bowman reviews points out that street harassment does
not occur in small villages where everyone knows each other, from
which the study's authors concluded that harassment occurs in a world
where people are strangers to one another.0 6 "Apparently if someone
exists for you as an individual, you are less likely to harass her-a fact
reflected in the prototypical question used to confront harassers: 'Would
302. Id. at 520 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 3, ch. vi § 57
at 29 (T.W. Gough ed., corrected & rev. ed. 1956) (3d ed. 1698)).
303. Id. at 526.
304. Id. at 527.
305. Id. at 520-21.
306. Id. at 530 (citing Cheryl Benard & Edit Schlaffer, The Man in the Street: Why He
Harasses, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 70, 72 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Roth-
enberg eds., 2d ed. 1984)).
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you want someone to treat your sister (or wife, or mother) this way?' 0
Viewed in these terms, harassment is the stripping of individuality from
women who venture into the public sphere, be it for their own private
purposes or for work.
In addition to identifying the more global injuries that occur to
women as a result of harassment, Bowman also catalogues discreet inju-
ries that would be legally cognizable.358 The harms most frequently
associated with street harassment are "the intrusion upon privacy and
the fear of rape."' 9 Given the high proportion of women who have been
raped, this is a widely and rationally held fear. She notes that street har-
assment can enable men to "test" which women would be most
vulnerable to assault."" Women typically react to these assaults and their
own fear by trying to appear as though nothing has happened, behavior
which may lead to depression and feelings of disempowerment"' These
fears are also applicable in cases of third party harassment, especially in
situations, such as business trips or contacts in isolated locations like
library stacks, in which the harasser may be able to threaten and carry
through with a rape.
Other injuries that Bowman describes are a loss of self-esteem by
being reduced to a sexual object, and injuries that are also typical of
workplace harassment such as "anxiety, stress, lack of motivation,
guilt, . . . disgust, hurt and anger."'
One of Bowman's more interesting contributions to the catalogue
of ways in which harassment is harmful is by also asking how street har-
assment harms women and society generally. The fear of harassment
simultaneously creates a dependence upon men to protect women, and a
307. Bowman, supra note 274, at 530-31.
308. Id. at 534-42.
309. Id. at 535. Although it is probably apparent that third parry harassment is an intru-
sion into privacy, it may not be as apparent that it can lead to fear of rape also.
Consider this story that I was told in the course of my research: A male customer
sought to have his hair cut at a local, leading beauty salon. He specifically asked for a
female stylist. Once she began to cut his hair, he began to ask her questions about
herself, including the general area of town in which she lived. Shortly thereafter, he
began to fondle his genitals. He also began to make comments along the following
lines, "Gee, that part of town is dangerous at night. Don't you worry about walking
home alone?" When the stylist requested that this customer be given to another, pref-
erably male, stylist if he should return, management refused her request. Apparently
her concerns about a veiled threat of rape didn't dissuade them either.
310. Id. at 536.
311. Id. at 537.
312. Id. at 538.
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distrust and hostility of men generally. 3 Additionally, women learn that
the only safe place in society is at home, and that they do not belong in
public, or by extension, in the workplace." 4 Ultimately, she argues, this
limit upon women's freedom means that they are not full and equal citi-
zens participating in the life of the commonwealth. 15 She concludes that
"E[nor those of us who believe in the ideal of equality, such a result is
damaging not only to half of the human population, but to society as a
whole. 31 6 Translated to the workplace, these observations strongly sug-
gest that third party harassment limits women's freedom and equality by
objectifying them and controlling their choice of occupations. In turn
our economy loses the contributions and talents of over one-half of its
potential workforce, affecting all of society.
In A Radical Reshaping of the Law: Interpreting and Remedying Street
Harassment, Tiffanie Heben makes many of the same points as Bow-
man." 7 She reminds us that women are individuals and their reactions
to harassment may depend upon content, the messenger, or physical
location.1 She urges us to be aware of the following differences between
women's experiences when evaluating harassment: severity, sexual orien-
tation, race, class, ethnicity, and location. 9
Because workplace sexual harassment has received so much treat-
ment in the last fifteen years, many of the ills it causes are well
documented in both the popular press and the academic literature.
Catharine MacKinnon, of course, provided the first in-depth treatment
of this phenomenon, giving it life as a cause of action in her book, Sex-
ual Harassment of Working Women."' In the intervening years, other
scholars have addressed the issues which arise as this doctrine continues
to develop. It has also been enriched by writing about other areas of vio-
lence for women such as rape and domestic assault. Since women still
313. Id. at 540-42.
314. Id. at 541.
315. Id. at 542.
316. Id. at 542.
317. Heben, supra note 278, at 189-204 (discussing the following types of harm: physical
reactions (nausea, trembling etc.), lowered self-esteem, reduced quality of life, denial
of full citizenship rights, and feelings of powerlessness). She also points out that this
should be considered systematic harm, not isolated occurrences.
318. Id. at 189-91. Heben makes it clear that she rejects essentialism, the idea that there is
only one women's experience.
319. Id. at 190-201.
320. MAcKINNON, supra note 6. The literature between the time of this article and
MacKinnon's original work is voluminous, and no attempt will be made to canvass
that literature.
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lack full equality, feminist writers point to what has gone wrong with
legal reform, and identify the ways in which law has hurt women. For
example, Estrich states:
[R]eform failed not because feminists are not good at writing
statutes, but because if there is one area of social behavior
where sexism is entrenched in law-one realm where tradi-
tional male prerogatives are most protected, male power most
jealously preserved, and female power most jealously limited-
it is in the area of sex itself, even forced sex.1
21
Given that harm is assumed and documented, the focus of these
writers has been on the task of identifying the ways in which the law
continues to harm women. For Estrich, this has translated into a differ-
ent treatment for some issues of sex discrimination, including sexual
harassment, than for other bases under Title VII.3 22 Particularly unhelp-
ful has been the legal system's lack of will in dealing with sexual
harassment because it would change the way business is conducted in
America.3 23 This has led Estrich to propose that courts do away with the
welcomeness requirement in sexual harassment cases. 2 She has pointed
out other problematic parts of the traditional doctrine as well. As an
example, she finds the current view of pervasiveness harmful because:
[I]n defining what counts as trivial or "de minimis," many
courts have wrongly looked to social interaction outside the
workplace as the standard, ignoring not only the "captive au-
dience" nature of the employment context but also the fact
that "society" hardly reflects a normative standard which
women have had an equal role in shaping.
25
Estrich, like the writers about street harassment, points out that
women's choices about work are limited, they are rarely truly volun-
tary. 26 In her view, a "reasonable woman" is expected to act like a man.
The cost of "acting like a man," as the law instructs, is that women must
tolerate the intolerable. 27
321. Estrich, supra note 266, at 814-15.
322. Id. at 819-23.
323. Id. at 822.
324. Id. at 826-34.
325. Id. at 843.
326. Id. at 846.
327. Id. at 846-47.
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Kathryn Abrams also attacks the limited effect the law has on "the
norms that have structured the workplace," pointing to the men who
shape the norms of the workplace and who fail to perceive the inherent
bias of these norms. 28 For Abrams the "next phase of the struggle for
gender equality in the workplace" is to ameliorate the harm of reading
situations through traditional male norms and to recognize women's
perspectives. 29 One of Abrams' focal points is sexual harassment. Her
analysis of the case law reveals many of the same failings identified by
Estrich 3  In her view, much of the harm from sexual harassment also
has to do with the reasons for silence: that men regard this behavior dif-
ferently than women. Because most judges are males and share a similar
viewpoint, they fail to treat harassment with sufficient attention.3 1 For
Abrams, the law is likely to do harm because, while it has largely elimi-
nated quid pro quo sexual demands, many courts continue to find
"verbal sexual abuse, casual touching, and dissemination or display of
pornography" acceptable even though these behaviors "make women
feel physically vulnerable and professionally undervalued. 3 32 These tol-
erated behaviors may lead to feelings of vulnerability and fear that affect
a woman's job performance by objectifying women as sex objects and
undermining their value as employees.33
328. Abrams, supra note 262, at 1189.
329. Id. at 1190. Abrams points out, however, that feminists do not agree on a philosophi-
cal underpinning (difference, domination, relation), id. at 1188-89, and that they
have proposed a variety of ways and means to alter the current legal framework. Id. at
1190-92. Abrams favors transforming the prevalent male norms by integrating
norms reflective of "women's needs and experiences." Id. at 1192.
330. Id. at 1197-1220. The second half of her article focuses on parenting policies. Id. at
1220-47.
331. Id. at 1202-03. The factors that Abrams highlights as different in the workplace for
women is their status as newcomers to the workplace, often resulting in "marginal or
precarious" status, id. at 1204-05, their generally different attitudes towards sexuality
in the workplace as well as the places in which expression of sexuality is appropriate,
and their "greater physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion." Id. at 1205.
332. Id. at 1206.
333. Of course, not every writer, nor every woman writer, agrees with the authors I have
selected nor of feminist jurisprudence generally. For example, an argument that
many, if not most, feminists would find repugnant appears in Kelly Ann Cahill,
Hooters: Should There Be An Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 48 VAND. L. Rav. 1107 (1995) (arguing that
hostile environment sexual harassment doctrine should also include a defense of
assumption of risk, even if the defense does not go by that name). Some feminists
would laud this article since it implicitly proposes that the law should allow women
to make their own choices, and that the law should not treat them, in any fashion, as
victim. Also, for another approach to sexual harassment doctrine consider Marie T.
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All of this scholarship demonstrates the ways in which harassment
limits women's freedom. This limitation, in the workplace, means that
women have fewer economic opportunities, typically due to job segrega-
tion, and that their ability to earn a living based on their merits is
diminished. Fear of harassment from third parties in addition to super-
visors and co-workers creates an iron triangle of harm. The harm that is
done to women as people, however, is even greater. It sends women the
message that at best, they are marginal, and at worst, nothing more than
sexual objects.
2. Sociology of Work-Sex and Work: Like the relatively short life of
doctrinal and legal writing about sexual harassment, harassment came to
the attention of researchers only recently. The leading scholar in this
area is Barbara Gutek, whose ground breaking work, Sex and the
Workplace34 has been at the core of many of the legal writings described
above. This section will draw primarily on her work as an exemplar of
the available scholarship.
One of the starting points in looking at this area of scholarship is
the central role that work now plays in our lives. It is one of the primary
ways in which we identify ourselves, and increasingly, it is a locus of our
social lives. Rather than church, home, and community, we meet at
work, and many of our social interactions arise from work. Moreover, in
the last sixty years, the workplace has become the locus of government
regulation. It is no secret that women have entered the workplace in
droves and that their entry was in large part made possible by Title VII.
It is this world that Gutek and others examine in seeking to understand
the ways in which sexual harassment occurs, how it might be precisely
defined, and what impacts it has on the workplace.
a. Silence: Like the legal literature, one of the focal points of social
science research has been reflection on why we know so little about sex-
ual harassment. Gutek notes that sexual harassment did not really
become a focal point of study until after the EEOC Guidelines were
published in 1980, making most research comparatively recent. 35 Even
Reilly, A Paradigm for Sexual Harassment; Toward the Optimal Level ofLoss, 47 VAND.
L. REv. 427 (1994) (using a law and economics approach to analyzing sexual
harassment doctrine). Reilly is particularly critical of feminist scholarship because it is
not sufficiently definite nor concrete in defining sexual harassment or proposing
remedies. Additionally, she notes that "[l]uxuriously, MacKinnon and her followers
ignore entirely the social cost of such a societal restructuring." Id. at 429.
334. Gutek, supra note 12.
335. Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 335, 338 (1992). See also Bernstein, supra note 281, at 1241
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within the study of workplace harassment, Gutek discovered other fac-
tors that would account for the silence that is also described by feminist
writers. One coping mechanism that Gutek and other researchers identi-
fied is the strategy of remaining silent and not complaining to
supervisors or others about their harassment."' Other researchers report
similar findings, some stating that women found it easier to quit than to
complain. " 7
Gutek, however, identifies other reasons why incidents of harass-
ment do not come to our notice. One of her primary insights has been
that men and women tend to perceive what constitutes sexual harass-
ment differently. For example, consider this chart:
TABLE I1: WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT?.. s
MALES FEMALES
Is sexual harassment
Complimentary comments 21.9% 33.5%
Insulting Comments 70.3 85.5
Complimentary looks, gestures 18.9 28.9
Insulting looks, gestures 61.6 80.3
Nonsexual touching 6.6 7.3
Sexual touching 58.6 84.3
n.76 in which she reports that in both the United States and Europe, the "magnitude
of hostile-environment harassment remains underappreciated."
336. Gutek, supra note 12, at 72. Women express a variety of reasons for not reporting
sexual harassment: fear of being blamed for the harassment-"you brought it on
yourself"-(60% of those surveyed), thinking that nothing would be done (60%),
fear that the male perpetrator could be hurt (66%), feeling too embarrassed to report
the incident (31%), thinking that it would take too much time to report the incident
(32%), and belief that basically, there was no real need to report it (82%).
337. SIEGEL, supra note 286, at 12 (citing FREADA KLEIN, THE 1988 WORKING WOMEN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY EXECUTIVE REPORT (1988)). Citing other studies, the
authors note that fear of retaliation was the major reason women fail to report har-
assment. An additional reason identified by the research surveyed was that because
women are socialized to keep harmony in relationships, they often try to maintain
contact with the harasser and attempt to "normalize" the interactions. Id. at 13.
Estrich, supra note 266, at 851-52 notes that this failure to report appears in the
court opinions she studied: "But in fact, one sees few cases of women who do this
[complain]. Indeed, the opinions which most emphatically announce this standard of
conduct almost always involve women who did not complain." (emphasis in original).
She then cites Gutek for social science support, id. at 852 n. 153.
338. Gutek, supra note 12, at 43.
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Expected socializing
Expected sexual activity
Later, in a chapter entitled, "Women's and Men's Attitudes About
Sexuality in the Workplace," Gutek notes that the biggest gap in
male/female attitudes was in their "reactions to overtures from the op-
posite sex." 39 For example, she found that 67% of males were flattered
by propositions but that only 17% of women felt similarly. 40 Gutek
attributes some of this difference to the fact that most women do not see
the workplace as a place to "verify or validate their sexual desirability,"
preferring instead to focus on their work-based accomplishments.34" '
Another factor that Gutek identifies as contributing to our conspir-
acy of silence about sexual harassment is corporate culture itself. At the
outset of her book, she writes that "theories of organization do not pro-
vide much room for the expression of sexuality. Sexuality is emotional,
not rational." '342 Thus, she argues, while sexuality has always been pre-
sent at the workplace, because most models of corporate or
organizational behavior presume a rational environment, they have not
focused on emotional or non-rational behavior that may influence cor-
porate actors. Sexuality, in the corporate setting, until recently, was
invisible. 43
b. Harm and Causation: Gutek identifies many of the same harms
identified previously. In the workplace, in addition to the pain and
violation of privacy, Gutek reports that women's careers are interrupted,
they fear retaliation, and they may "experience lower productivity, less
job satisfaction, reduced self-confidence, and a loss of motivation and
commitment to their work and their employer."3" Additionally, she
notes that harassment can constrain workplace behavior as women try to
avoid harassers, even if it is important to interact with those men during
work. In general, harassment she concludes, will create a high stress
environment which she describes as a "hidden occupational hazard."
Gutek confirms that it also serves to maintain sex segregation. 45 Finally,
339. Id. at 96.
340. Id. at 96-97.
341. Id. at 100-01. See also Hadfield, supra note 292, at 1154 nn.4-5.
342. Gutek, supra note 12, at 4.
343. Id. at 4-5.
344. Gutek, supra note 335, at 349.
345. Id. at 348-49, and sources cited therein.
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she notes that harassment can have effects away from work, interfering
with women's significant relationships with men. 46
Aside from cataloging these consequences, Gutek's biggest contri-
bution has been to explain why sexual harassment happens. At the
beginning of her book, Gutek notes there have been three main social
science models for studying sex at work: (1) the natural-biological,
which argues that it is a result of natural attraction and has the least
support in the literature; (2) the organizational model, in which sexual
harassment is the result of opportunities within organizations to engage
in harassment; and (3) the sociocultural model, in which sexual harass-
ment reflects society's differential distribution of power and status
between the sexes.347 Gutek, however, found that none of these explana-
tions fully account for the "why" of sexual harassment and has proposed
her theory of "sex role spillover., 348
The theory begins with the idea that we tend to associate members
of each sex with certain attributes. For example, we tend to think of
women as emotional or sexy. "Sex-role spillover occurs when women,
more than men in the same work roles, are expected to be sex objects or
are expected to project sexuality through their behavior, appearance, or
dress., 349 Why does spillover occur? Gutek suggests that because gender
is our most obvious social characteristic, we immediately notice it. Men
tend to treat and react to women in the same manner regardless of the
context, and women tend to conform to this stereotype drawn largely
on home-based interactions between the sexes. Finally, sex roles and
expectations tend to be more stable and are formed while young, while
our work expectations may change.3 '0 The point, says Gutek, is that
"subtle pressures" exist for women to behave and be perceived as sexual
at work, leaving others with the belief that it is a part of a working
woman's repertoire.35" '
3. Corporate Dignitary Theories: Most articles on sexual harassment
derive their arguments from feminist sources, or from social sciences.
Although many of them allude to a role for the corporate context or
work environment in which harassment takes place, very few have
sought to tackle reforming corporate structures directly. The purpose of
346. Id. at 349.
347. Gutek, supra note 12, at 12-15.
348. Id. at 15.
349. Gutek, supra note 335, at 353.
350. Id. at 353-54.
351. Id. at 354.
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this section will be to survey some emerging theories about corporate
law and corporate behavior which may suggest ways in which the corpo-
ration could be more responsive to complaints about third party
harassment or harassment generally.
52
This reluctance to tackle corporate structure head on seems a bit
odd when one considers that the costs of sexual harassment accrue not
only to the victim, but also to her employer, often some form of corpo-
rate entity. For example, one source suggests that in 1988, sexual
harassment cost a typical Fortune 500 company $6.7 million dollars per
year in terms of lost productivity, employee turnover, and the cost of
complaint mechanisms. The same source suggests that preventive
mechanisms are far cheaper-thirty-four times less expensive. 53 Like-
wise, a report of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 1987 survey
reported similarly high costs to the government as a result of sexual har-
assment.354 This is true not only of United States firms, but also for
corporations abroad.355
There is ample research to suggest that sexual harassment can be a
structural or systemic problem of an organization and can affect an or-
ganization in both indirect and direct ways. For example, Gutek states
that the existence of sexual harassment within an organization can affect
not only its workers and their jobs, but also the image of the organiza-
tion. 6 In fact, the very definition and name "hostile environment
harassment" connotes the idea that this is a systemic phenomena, not
just one that occurs in a private or individual setting. That is, the work-
place environment is characterized by "pervasive" sexual harassment.
Gutek reports that views among corporations vary as to whether
they see sexual harassment as "personal" behavior or as "organizational"
behavior. And, she points out, the corporation's point of view affects the
type of remedy that a firm might employ. For example, she suggests that
a corporation using the "old" or "personal" point of view is more likely
352. Although not everyone works for a corporation, a large majority of Americans do.
The corporation is the locus of much of the legal regulation of the workplace. This
makes it a particularly apt focus for legal or structural reform. Title VII assumes ju-
risdiction over firms that have 15 or more employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (2001),
and many state or local statutes assume jurisdiction over smaller entities.
353. SIEGEL, supra note 286, at 10 (citing KLEIN, supra note 286).
354. Id. (citing U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment of Federal
Workers: An Update (1988)).
355. Bernstein, supra note 281, at 1286 n.278 and accompanying text. Her overall point is
that sexual harassment can affect a firm's competitiveness both in terms of the type of
talent it can attract as well as the way in which the costs of harassment can divert its
use of its resources.
356. Gutek, supra note 12, at 2-3.
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to transfer or fire the accuser, since it is most worried about retaining
the highest status employee. On the other hand, a corporation following
an organizational model is more likely to take harassment seriously and
to seek ways in which the organizational sources of the behavior can be
altered, as through classes or policies. 57
Additionally, Gutek points out that one of the accounts that both
seeks to explain sexual harassment and is implicated in any number of
management and legal theories, is an organizational model in which
"sexual harassment is the result of certain opportunity structures within
organizations such as hierarchy." '358 Although the point of her theory of
"sex role spillover" is that the prevailing models under-explain sexual
harassment, she nonetheless notes that "[u]nderstanding the work envi-
ronment is crucial to understanding what occurs there."359 She identifies
the following four aspects of workplace organization, which are crucial
to understanding sex in the workplace:
* sex segregation of work
• status differentials
* working conditions
* personal characteristics of workers36
In later chapters, Gutek refines these generalizations and pinpoints
more exactly other sources of organizational behavior."'
357. Id. at 12.
358. Id. at 14.
359. Id. at 22.
360. Id. at 22-23. For explanations of sex segregation, see notes and accompanying text.
Gutek has a similar meaning, which is that occupations tend to be sorted by sex into
"men's" and "women's" work, and until recently men and women did not interact
together in the workplace. Id. at 25-30. In speaking of status and hierarchy, she iden-
tifies the phenomena that men tend to occupy the highest status jobs and get the
perks that come with that status. Id. at 31. In her section on working conditions, she
notes that women prefer "cleaner, pleasanter" environments that are free of swearing
or other sexualized behavior. Id. at 32. Additionally, she notes that while it is com-
monly known that attractiveness matters in the workplace, this is a more important
determinant for women than for men. Id. at 33-34. Finally, while she notes that sex
segregation is the most important variable, the sex of the supervisor can also make a
difference, especially since the "most important organizational member for any
worker" is the supervisor. Id. at 37.
361. Id. at Ch. 7 passim. Gutek particularly points to the types of contact or structure
within which one has contact with the other sex, i.e., the "ambiance" and whether it
can be characterized as professional or unprofessional, and whether the workplace is
sexualized. She notes, additionally, that more research is needed. She concludes:
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In this sense, also, the "customer is always right" totem is another
structural impediment which inhibits an already compromised ability to
complain about harassment. It contributes to the organizational/legal
catch-22 for women: if you don't complain, you may not be able to
prove unwelcomeness in court, yet if you do complain about customer
treatment, you could well lose your job.
Since the research suggests that corporate structure may well foster
and perpetuate sexual harassment, and that there are corporate costs
associated with harassment, it would make sense to rethink legal models
of the corporation to foster more productive behavior. In an era of
downsizing, shifting employee loyalty, and rising corporate litigation
costs, it is imperative for corporations to rethink their approach to their
labor force. Legal scholarship and law needs to be more concerned with
the relationship between corporate structures and sexual harassment.
62
Traditional economic theory, building on the work of Ronald
Coase, posits that the firm is a "nexus of contracts," in which the
implicit and explicit contractual relationships between managers,
workers, shareholders, suppliers and others define each corporate
From the standpoint of the general good of the work organization, sex at
work has little to recommend it. It appears to be part of a cluster of unpro-
fessional behaviors and attitudes-an unprofessional ambience-that
characterizes some workplaces .... Even sex that is not viewed as a
problem-sexual comments meant to be complimentary, for example-has
some negative consequences for organizations in the form of lower job sat-
isfaction for women.
Id. at 124.
362. See, Schultz, supra note 268, at 1770 ("To a large extent, however, the structures of
the workworld that disempower most working women from ever aspiring to nontra-
ditional work are left unexamined."). Schultz makes a very deft argument that the
courts, in sex discrimination cases, have not been as willing to examine and reform
the structure of the workplace as they have been in race cases. Id. at 1770-71. She
takes up this argument again at a later point in the article, declaring that judicial ac-
counts of sex segregation in the workplace "ultimately assume away the major
problem [T]itle VII should be addressing: the organization of work structures and
workplace cultures to disempower large numbers of women from aspiring to and suc-
ceeding in more highly rewarded nontraditional work." Id. at 1800. This leads her,
ultimately, to argue that work structures and cultures significantly influence women's
perceptions of their opportunities at work. Id. at 1815-39. From her point of view,
then, the law has an important role in transforming structures at work to eradicate
discrimination against women. Id. at 1816.
Similarly, from a comparative law perspective, Anita Bernstein makes the
following oberservation: "While Americans see the problem of sexual harassment as
either wrongful private conduct between two people or as sex discrimination, Euro-
peans have shaped it as a problem of workers, ind sited the problem in the
workplace." Berstein, supra note 281, at 1233.
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entity."' As further developed by theorists such as Oliver Williamson,
economic theory, and the legal theory which adopts it, make
assumptions about human behavior. Typically, these theories assume
that people will act in a rational manner on the basis of the information
that they have at the time, and that they may well engage in
opportunistic behavior, seeking to benefit their own self interest. As it
pertains to the maintenance of the workplace, employers and employees
develop a set of explicit and implicit contractual arrangements that may
rely upon legal enforcement, as in the case of a collective bargaining
agreement, or extra-legal enforcement relying upon a firm's reputation
and employee loyalty.3 65 What has often been missing in corporate
theory is close attention to the role of human capital, and whether
prevailing economic theories, focused as they are on self-interest and
maximization of profit, either fully explain employee behavior or in any
way seek to improve it.
Recent theorists have insisted that the theoretical foundations of
corporate legal and economic theory need to be opened wider to admit
the complexity of human relationships. The two that will be examined
here, as exemplars, are those of Karen Newman and Marleen O'Connor.
While most of these writers have been focused on general questions sur-
rounding the relationship between the corporation and its workforce,
particularly in the important labor question of how to foster meaningful
participation, these theories have ramifications for other areas of the law,
such as sexual harassment, which involves the relationship between a
corporation and its employees.
At the heart of a harassment-free workplace is the desire for justice
in the workplace. Newman observed that the "concept of justice ...
receives little attention in the workplace ... [and] is not well under-
stood in that context." '366 She focuses her attention on how justice
manifests itself in the workplace and how the workplace can be made
more just."' While employees pay attention to the actual administration
363. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 905 (1993) (cit-
ing Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)).
364. Id. at 905-07.
365. Id. at 907-11.
366. Karen L. Newman, The Just Organization: Creating and Maintaining Justice in Work
Environments, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1489, 1489 (1993).
367. A major part of her article is the interpretation of a simulation study she ran over two
years with 15 separate companies using 289 full-time MBA students who had worked
an average of 3.7 full-time years before attending school. Each student, in role, had to
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of justice, both in outcome and process, their perceptions of justice in
the workplace may have an even stronger bearing on their behavior and
relationship to their firm.3 68 This is because the moral climate of an or-
ganization is an outgrowth of employees' perceptions of "the way in
which problems are perceived, people are treated, and decisions are
made. 3 69 There are three acknowledged types of moral climate: egocen-
tric, rule-oriented, and principled. 70 An egocentric climate focuses on
self-interest mediated through contracts. A rule-oriented one, obviously,
is based upon a set of rules which the employees have accepted. Finally,
a principled or ethical climate is one "based on principles of justice, re-
spect for the dignity of individuals, and maintenance of social
obligations. '
Karen Newman's study372 and theory suggests that justice, defined
as granting employees dignity and voice in the workplace, does matter
evaluate an "in basket" of memos which included memos from the company's presi-
dent designed to send messages about the company's moral climate. She assessed
responses for four dependent variables (commitment, decision-making, willingness to
work hard, and performance) and five independent variables (voice, dignity, relation-
ship with supervisor, ethical climate, and rule-oriented climate). The results
demonstrated that "commitment among employees is higher when companies allow
more participation and when a respectful and trusting relation~hip exists between su-
pervisor and subordinate." Id. at 1507. She could not find a correlation between
commitment and dignity but hypothesized that this may have more to do with inter-
personal relations. Similarly, employees who are allowed "voice" and who are treated
with dignity tend to be willing to work harder. Again, her focus is on participation in
the workplace but her results have obvious bearing on a firm's willingness to develop
and enforce a meaningful sexual harassment policy. Assuming that such a policy is a
part of recognizing each worker's dignity, the existence and enforcement of a policy is
more likely to garner employee loyalty and increased efforts. There is no reason to
suppose that employees would distinguish between supervisor, co-employee and third
party harassment in perceiving whether their employer is committed to ending all
harassment. In fact, it would be likely that the prohibition of traditional harassment,
along with a tolerance or encouragement of third party harassment, could send a
strong mixed message to employees.
368. Id. at 1490.
369. Id. at 1496. To expand a bit, Newman defines corporate culture as the "norms, val-
ues, and assumptions that form the foundation for interaction in the firm," and notes
that psychologists refer to this as a climate. Id. at 1496. Thus, "[t]he moral climate of
an organization is based on the perceptions of the organization's members about
practices and procedures that have moral content, that exist in the realm of what the
firm values, believes in, and considers right." Id. See also supra note 27 and accompa-
nying text (emphasis in original text).
370. Id. at 1497.
371. Id. at 1497.
372. Id.
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and can increase employee effort and performance.37 Thus, the imposi-
tion of a policy or rules about sexual harassment may not be sufficient to
garner the results, not just in legal compliance but in positive employee
outcomes, that many firms seek. Mere rules do not foster trust or dig-
nity, nor do they insure honesty and respect. Moreover, rules can
increase employee commitment to the firm which can help employees
and employers weather hard times or changes in the firm."' This can
also be an important commitment as companies move from a traditional
hierarchical model to a modern post-hierarchical, knowledge-based firm
and jobs become more broadly defined. 75
A second voice in the new corporate literature is Marleen
O'Connor, whose work has focused on corporate law and developing
structures and laws for the participation of workers in workforce deci-
sion-making. Observing that many workers will remain with a firm for
some time, O'Connor is critical of traditional theories of labor markets
to explain employee behavior and argues that internal markets develop
between workers and their firm.376 In a world where employee coopera-
tion is becoming increasingly important for the modern post-
hierarchical corporation, O'Connor focuses on how firms can gain em-
ployee loyalty and trust. She argues that the old models don't explain
how or why these capacities might be created, and that we need to de-
velop "organizational arrangements that are best suited to motivate a
highly committed workforce to utilize fully their ... abilities. 377 In her
opinion, the key is understanding how firms can foster trust, which she
views as "beyond individual rational choice. 3 78 Echoing Newman she
states:
373. Id. at 1511.
374. Id. at 1510.
375. Charles D. Watts, Jr., In Critique of a Reductivist Conception and Examination of "The
Just Organization," 50 WASH. & LEE L. Ruv. 1515, 1517 (fall 1993) (responding to
Prof. Newman).
376. O'Connor, supra note 363, at 907-08.
377. Id. at 917. O'Connor's discussion is preceded by an analysis, using game theory, of
why the traditional "nexus of contracts" approach to employee relations is not going
to work. Both parties have risks in making commitments to one another often lead-
ing to low trust and high conflict in this current era of corporate re-structuring and
downsizing. Id. at 926. Her argument, in a nutshell, is that we need to foster partici-
patory programs as a way to break out of the adversarial, non-cooperative prisoners
dilemma of corporate relations that is currently played out.
378. Id. at 929.
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The language of economics fails to encompass the reality of
moral commitments because it has no way of discussing the
concept of trust except by treating it as a commodity that can
be exchanged. Discussing trust as a commodity is not only de-
humanizing, it is also self-defeating because genuine trust is
not experienced in utilitarian terms."'
O'Connor shifts her analysis from economics to the findings of so-
ciologists, in particular George Akerlof and Amitai Etzioni. They
suggest that trust is the result of a gift exchange between employees and
their firm. Social conventions and moral values help to define what is
appropriate behavior in this exchange. As parties make their decision,
they operate through the medium of "loyalty filters," that is, past experi-
ences, which affect the content and strength of their loyalties and
commitments."' O'Connor goes on to suggest that the legal environ-
ment is a key determinant of new models of trust and participation
because it promotes cultural conditions and incentives. In her view,
other theorists, like Oliver Williamson, have tended to ignore the way in
which the law affects industrial relations by shaping behavior. 81
What is the salience of this for third party sexual harassment? The
law and relationships captured by Title VII are a significant part of the
workplace. Gutek suggests that our traditional views of the firm focus
on the rational and thus miss many of the obvious and subtle facets of
human actions that contribute to behavior, both productive and non
productive, within a firm. O'Connor suggests that, in addition to
Newman's sense of justice, it is also important for firms to create an
environment in which employees can trust the firm. Seeking the
eradication of third party harassment within the control of the firm is
one step a firm could take to foster that trust. Thus, the failure of courts
to remedy or even entertain third party sexual harassment claims sends a
message to the firms as well as to the public that this is tolerable
behavior.
O'Connor enriches this portrait of the firm in subsequent work.
Again, moving from the thesis that inspires her work-that
conventional economic models fail to accurately portray modern
workplace issues-she looks to socio-economics to suggest ways to
379. Id. at 930.
380. Id. at 931-32.
381. Id. at 944- 4 5.
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enrich the classical description of the firm.382 Rather than relying on the
classical economics of self-interest as a way out of the prisoners'
dilemma, she focuses on socio-economics. Socio-economics suggests
that ethical obligations to cooperate and feelings of group solidarity and
identity can increase cooperation and improve working conditions. 3
O'Connor rejects the notion that "trust" is only for the private sphere,
arguing that it has a role to play in the organization of the firm. She
hypothesizes that trust can explain differences in productivity, and
explores how it can be developed and fostered. 84 In the course of her
analysis, O'Connor observes that we need to make "more open use of
ethical language in discussing economic life" and that our "rhetoric
counts" in shaping an environment in which ethics and trust matter. In
this view, traditional economics' focus on self-interested behavior leads
to an atmosphere of cold calculation which is inimical to fostering other
human values that could exist in the workplace. 85 She also reaffirms her
view of the role of law in this process:
In fostering corporate cultures that will allow employees to act
as moral agents, we need to consider the interplay between the
legal system and less formal systems of social control. In my
view, the law exerts a tremendous influence on the ongoing
process of the development of cooperative norms in the work-
place .... Of course, cooperative impulses are not directly
traceable to labor laws, but the law can influence the socializa-
tion processes that play a major role in preference formation.
The most significant aspect of employment law is symbolic
and pedagogic because in many instances the threat of formal
sanctions is remote. To me, the way we talk about trust in the
employment setting is crucial because the most distinguishing
characteristic of labor law is its operation as a system of moral
education that promotes cooperation in the workplace.386
Finally, working from a comparativist perspective, rather than an
economic one, Anita Bernstein suggests another way in which harass-
ment is a structural problem. Bernstein compares American perspectives
382. Marleen A. O'Connor, A Socio-Economic Approach to the Japanese Corporate Govern-
ance Structure, 50 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1529, 1533-34 (fall 1993).
383. Id. at 1534-36.
384. Id. at 1539-40.
385. Id. at 1542-43.
386. Id. at 1545 (citations omitted).
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on sexual harassment with those held in Europe, where it is largely re-
garded as a workplace problem. 87 Bernstein tellingly claims that the
American focus on tort aspects of sexual harassment, focused as they are
on individual harm, have prevented us from seeing how this is a prob-
lem of the workplace, and that a typical European workplace-health
approach and an American tort approach need not be an either/or
proposition.3 88 Thus, she points out four different insights that an ex-
amination of European law brings to the problem of sexual harassment:
1. It is a problem of the workplace, and is a danger to health
and safety. 89
2. Sexual harassment imposes economics costs on employers,
governments and individuals. As she states succinctly, it
"amounts to a tax on women who venture into the work-
place. 090
3. Sexual harassment is an affront to the dignity of workers
and this concept broadens the base with which to form
opposition to sexual harassment.39'
4. Decentralization: Here, rather than impose one European
Community standard, the Europeans are "trusting" that
national solutions can be developed. Given the national
applicability of Title VII, this approach is of little utility
in the United States.
After a critique of the American fault-based approach to harass-
ment, Bernstein points out that in Europe, in addition to having a right
to be free from sexual harassment, workers also have an "enforceable
right to be treated with dignity. 3 2 Because harassment is structurally
embedded into the United States, Bernstein is more willing to consider
a rich notion of safety regulation to combat harassment. 93 She con-
cludes: "Sexual harassment is a problem of money, health and safety,
387. Bernstein, supra note 281, at 1233.
388. Id. at 1259.
389. Id. at 1256-60.
390. Id. at 1260-62 (citations omitted).
391. Id. at 1262-64 (confirming indirectly the observations of Newman and O'Connor,
Bernstein notes that ideas of dignity and justice play a larger role in European discus-
sions of workplace conditions. In this view, dignity is a minimal component of
workplace justice. The advantage of addressing sexual harassment in terms of digni-
tary interests is that it could broaden the groups of people opposed to sexual
harassment because it would be a worker's issue rather than a women's issue).
392. Id. at 1283.
393. Id. at 1297.
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and morality. To isolate it as a women's issue is not only to choose a
weak tactic but also to conceal a large portion of the truth.
3 94
4. Current Doctrine: Paradoxically, while much of this section has
been a dance between silence and voice, that is not exactly the case. Title
VII doctrine does address third party sexual harassment, and in the
EEOC Guidelines, third party sexual harassment is made actionable.395
What has been puzzling, however, is the reluctance of the courts to le-
gitimate and activate the language of the Guidelines. The argument is
straightforward: recognition of third party harassment is consistent with
both the goals and current doctrine of Title VII.
From the beginning, the goal of Title VII litigation has been to
make victims whole, and to eradicate discrimination."' To put a finer
point on the latter, it is to deter conduct that would be unlawful as well
as to "eliminate barriers" to equal employment opportunity.397 There is
nothing about recognition of third party harassment which would be
inconsistent with these goals. As documented above, the victims of third
party harassment suffer in ways that are identical to victims of conven-
tional sexual harassment: they suffer psychological and physical distress,
they may leave or quit a job, etc. Third party harassment can operate as
a "barrier" to greater employment opportunities for women by affecting
their choices about various types of work or workplaces. A person, for
example, who does not think she can suffer salacious customer com-
ments in silence is not going to take a service position that highlights
such service. And, in other types of job, say the practice of law, client
behavior can affect an associate and in turn affect her billable hours, cli-
ent contact and other factors upon which partnership decisions are
made. By pursuing a strategy of more rigorous enforcement of the
EEOC Guidelines, as they pertain to this type of harassment, one more
barrier for women in the workplace would be eradicated because em-
ployers would have an incentive to eliminate third party harassment
within their control.398 At the very least, it would suggest a tempering of
394. Id. at 1302 (citation omitted).
395. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (e) (2001). See supra note 11 for the pertinent text of the
Guidelines. This is also reinforced in the Commission's Compliance Manual. "The
harasser does not have to be the victim's supervisor. (S)he may also be ... a non-
employee." EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 615.2(b)(2) (2000). This is further de-
veloped in a later section of the manual. Id. at § 6 15.3(e).
396. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
397. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
398. At a minimum, employers can promulgate policies which provide that third party
harassment will not be tolerated and provide reporting mechanisms. Once employees
THE CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS RIGHT
the doctrine that "the customer is always right." If the customer is acting
in an illegal fashion, they aren't right and the employee should not have
to bear the consequences of their boorish or illegal behavior. To ask
them to do otherwise only encourages and creates a "safe harbor" for
sexual harassment.
Second, recognition of third party harassment is consistent with
current doctrine in this area, as the EEOC already recognizes. The
prima facie case as developed by the EEOC and adopted in this article is
consistent with previously existing approaches to more conventional
sexual harassment. Moreover, it is preferable that the constellation of
factual circumstances possible under this doctrine be treated consis-
tently.
Finally, there is ample precedent for the recognition that relation-S 399
ships with third parties may cause liabilities for an employer. As a
starting point, the law of agency itself, which Meritor00 endorses as a
baseline for judging employer culpability, suggests ways in which the
employer might be liable. At a minimum, Section 219(2)(b) of the
Restatement of Agency' °1 suggests that employer's can be liable for their
negligent or reckless behavior, °2 and this has been used in hostile envi-
ronment cases for imposing liability where employers fail to respond to
believe that they can report harassment without repercussions, the employee and em-
ployer can work together to develop creative solutions to the problem of
customer/client harassment. Similarly, many employers could easily post "no harass-
ment" policies at the doors of their establishments.
399. For a collection of other sources of liability, see Jeannie S. Rhee, Redressingfor Success:
The Liability of Hooters Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 175-76, nn.61-65 (1997) (touching on workers' compensation,
landlord's liability for trespassers, etc.)
400. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
401. That text provides: "(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless .... (b) the master was negligent
or reckless ..... ".RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). Consider also
Agency Restatement § 213 which provides:
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject
to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reck-
less: (a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders of [sic] in failing to make
proper regulations; or (b) in the employment of improper persons or in-
strumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others: [sic] (c) in the
supervision of the activity; or (d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negli-
gent, or other tortuous conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents,
upon premises or with instrumentalities under his control
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958) (emphasis added).
402. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57. As it has been applied by the courts, this has become part of
the notice requirements for a cause of action.
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complaints about harassment. Thus, at the very least, these sections sug-
gest that an employer who has been informed about third party
harassment has some duty to investigate the complaints and remedy
them if the facts so warrant. Section 213 suggests that the employer may
have affirmative duties to address harassment when the third party ha-
rasser acts on its premises.
B. Elements of a Prima Facie Case
of Third Party Harassment
The last task remaining is to craft and support a prima facie case of
third party harassment. 4° At this point, based on the limited amount of
doctrine in this area, there tend to be two general approaches. One is to
follow the prima facie case which is set out in the EEOC Guidelines,
and the lead cases which have interpreted it. The second is to follow the
Guidelines but to add qualifiers as to whether, by virtue of the type of
job, the woman had accepted the "risk" of third party harassment.' °
The prima facie case should follow the initial contours set out in the
EEOC Guidelines without any augmentation. The thesis is simple:
Third party sexual harassment interferes with a woman's ability to
perform her job, and in some cases, the selection or retention of
employment opportunities. These barriers violate both the letter and
spirit of Title VII. Therefore, if an employer knows of third party
harassment and does not exercise the available control over the situation,
and provide a prompt and appropriate remedy under the circumstances,
then it should be held liable. Women's ability to seek protection from
third party harassment should not depend upon the nature of their
403. The focus here will be based on the assumption that all third party sexual harassment
claims are going to come under the rubric of hostile environment harassment. The
implicit assumption has been that a third party is not in a position to exercise the au-
thority that would make a quidpro quo case possible. I think that analysis is wrong,
have chosen not to address it in depth in this article. But consider the following sce-
nario: An associate is having dinner with a firm's major client. During the course of
the dinner, the client requests sexual favors or the account will be withdrawn from
the firm. Given the particular atmosphere at the firm, and a number of other per-
sonal factors, the associate may conclude that she has no choice but to "acquiesce" in
order to retain the client for the firm, and her position within it.
404. See Aalberts & Seidman, Non-Employees, supra note 3, at 470-72 (women's jobs are
divided into categories of risk-low, medium and high); see also Reilly, supra note
333 (urging that this doctrine also be augmented by a notion of contributory negli-
gence or assumption of risk).
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employment or what they may be wearing or doing at any particular
moment.
Although the basic framework of a sexual harassment case was laid
out earlier, some of it bears repeating. Generally, the EEOC Guidelines,
Meritor, Harris and the other leading cases provide that for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment to cause employer liability, there must be
unwelcome conduct directed at the victim because of her sex that inter-
feres with her work or working conditions. Further, in the case of third
party harassment, the employer must know about the behavior, or
should have known about it, and failed to take prompt remedial action.
As it pertains to third party harassment specifically, the Guidelines
provide:
(e) An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-
employees, with respect to the sexual harassment of employees
in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervi-
sory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct
and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.
In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the ex-
tent of the employer's control and any other legal
responsibility which the employer may have with respect to
the conduct of such non-employees.0 5
405. EEOC Guidelines, § 160 4 .11(e) (1985). The EEOC has provided additional guid-
ance on these issues in supplementary publications, which generally focus on the
amount of control or legal responsibility that the employer may have over the third
party. See, e.g., Section 615.3(e), EEOC Compliance Manual. It states:
This section provides that an employer may also be responsible for the sex-
ual harassment of an employee by a non-employee. The basic standard
applied by this section is similar to that in the preceding section defining
employer responsibility for co-worker sexual harassment. The employer
may be responsible where the employer, or its agents, or its supervisory
employees knew or should have known of the unlawful conduct and the
employer failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. How-
ever, the difference between the two sections is that an employer is liable
for co-worker sexual harassment if the two conditions (knowledge and fail-
ure to take remedial action) are met. An employer is potentially liable for
non-employee sexual harassment in the same circumstances, but actual li-
ability depends upon additional factors as well.
This section identifies these additional factors as the extent of the em-
ployer's control over the non-employee and any other legal responsibility
which the employer may have with respect to the non-employee's conduct.
The Commission will determine an employer's liability for non-employee
sexual harassment on the basis of the total facts and circumstances of each
2002]
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The Aalberts model,' 6 on the other hand, follows the guidelines for
the most part. They depart from this model when they suggest that it is
possible to divide women's work into three categories: high-, medium-
and low-risk occupations. High-risk occupations would be those where
the job holder would expect harassment. 07 This approach has its roots
in the Meritor opinion where Justice Rehnquist, in dicta, opines that the
dress or speech of the victim might make a difference for liability.0 8 Al-
though this model may have a respectable pedigree, it should be
squarely rejected. Just as appearance makes no difference in race harass-
ment cases, it should make no difference in sexual harassment cases.
Here, Justice Rehnquist misunderstands that the gravamen of this case is
not about sexuality per se, but about targeting women for behaviors that
impede their ability to be successful in the workplace. It is also reminis-
cent of arguments, now rejected in the rape context, that "she asked for
it." The focus of the court's inquiry should be on the behavior of the
harasser, not on the behavior, dress, or appearance of the victim. ° Such
an approach is more consistent with the goals of Title VII of eradicating
case, including employer knowledge, corrective action, control, and other
legal responsibility. (See § 615.4(a) below on investigative procedure.)
.... (Examples omitted.)
It bears repeating that, although the victim in both of the examples re-
ported the non-employee's sexual harassment, such reporting is not a
requirement. However, it could have a bearing on the issue of employer
knowledge. (Citation omitted)
Because the Commission will decide the liability issue on a case-by-case ba-
sis, evidence that the wrongful conduct was by a non-employee of a certain
type or description (for example, a salesperson, or a repairperson, or a cus-
tomer) will neither conclusively establish nor bar employer liability.
Whether an employer is ultimately responsible will depend on the relation-
ship between the employer and the non-employee as revealed by the
specific factual context in which the allegedly unlawful conduct occurred.
(Emphasis in original.)
406. See Aalberts & Seidman, Clients, supra note 3. See supra text beginning at note 228.
407. Aalberts & Seidman, Clients, supra note 3, at 470-71. Other people suggest that an
assumption of risk defense should be added to the doctrine to also capture these dif-
ferences in occupations. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 333.
408. Meritor, 477 U.S., at 69.
409. Comparisons between rape law and sexual harassment law abound in the literature. It
has led many to argue that the unwelcomeness requirement should be abandoned.
For a strong statement of this position, see Estrich, supra note 266.
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employment discrimination since it puts responsibility back on the ha-
rasser and on the employer rather than on the woman."O
Obviously, under the proposed model, the tougher issue here is the
employer's ability to control the acts of third parties. Although the de-
velopment of the doctrine will ultimately be at the hands of the courts
and the EEOC, a few observations are offered. Assuming that an em-
ployer has knowledge of either actual third party sexual harassment or
its potential, the employer has to approach this issue from two perspec-
tives: reactive and proactive. That is, an employer must reactively focus
on what responsibilities it has once an act of harassment has been re-
ported and verified. At the same time, responsible employers should
proactively attempt to create a work environment in which opportuni-
ties for third party harassment are minimized, and when they occur are
dealt with swiftly and efficiently.
Employers are not the helpless entities that courts seem to make
them out to be. Corporate claims of powerlessness are unconvincing, as
a few examples will demonstrate. Take, for example, a situation that is
discussed in the EEOC Compliance Manual:
Example 1-When the waitress asked if the four male custom-
ers seated at the table were ready to order, one man put his
arm tightly around her waist and told her that what he wanted
was not on the menu, prompting his companions to laugh and
comment in the same vein. When she was finally able to finish
taking their orders, the man removed his arm and patted her
as she turned to leave. She went directly to the restaurant
manager and reported the unwelcome sexual conduct... (The
employer could have done something) as relatively simple as
switching table assignments to have a waiter finish serving that
table and making whatever arrangement might be necessary so
that the waitress would not be financially or otherwise harmed
by the substitution (for instance, by losing the amount of a tip
411
she could have earned).
While the EEOC at least suggests a remedy, it does not really go far
enough. In the case in which this example is based, there was a second
incident of harassment in which the waitress responded more
410. Rhee, supra note 399, at 203.
411. EEOC Compliance Manual § 615.3(e) (2000).
2002]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
vigorously, and she informed her employer, requesting an apology. For
her efforts, she was fired.412
What should the employer have done? For starters, the employer
should have taken her first complaint seriously. It was clear, in the real
incident, that the harassers were "friends" of the employer, and on this
basis it is assumed he had control over them. Since they were friends, it
would not have been unreasonable for him to ask his friends to apolo-
gize to the waitress. If this was impossible, the employer had control of
his premises, and he could have left a standing order that customers who
behave in this fashion be asked to leave. Either would have been a better
solution than asking the waitress to change tables or areas. Often, table
areas vary in terms of ease of servicing and likelihood of tips, and are
thus assigned on the basis of seniority, or some other factor. Asking the
waitress to change tables, while it removed her from the harassment,
sends two messages. It tells the complaining waitress that her economic
needs may be sacrificed if she complains. And second, it tells the offend-
ing customers that there is little if any sanction for harassing employees,
especially if they fail to note the change in waitstaff or are not told the
reason for the change. After the fact, the restaurant owner could have
barred these customers from his restaurant. This would not be unusual,
as at many restaurants, it is common for there to be lists of people
whose credit is suspect or who have passed bad checks to the establish-
ment. Although a list of harassers should not be publicly posted, it
should be readily available to staff. Finally, if this had been a situation
with a collective bargaining agreement, and the waitress' discharge had
gone to arbitration, a defense to the charge of insubordination and cus-
tomer rudeness is that she spoke back against unlawful sexual
harassment.
To act proactively will not really add much of a cost for employers
who are already abiding by the law, and have existing sexual harassment
policies and procedures in place. Moreover, because of the language in
Meritor, Ellerth and Faragher stating that an employer can limit its
liability by prompt remedial action and a targeted sexual harassment
policy, many courts have spoken to this issue at length and much of the
doctrinal contours of what is advisable are already in place. Although
many employers do have sexual harassment policies that include third
party situations, they should review their policies to make sure that this
type of harassment is covered and that their grievance mechanism is
412. EEOC Decision No. 84-3, supra note 173.
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prepared to handle complaints of this nature. Employers also may want
to re-think their corporate culture to see if employees would be com-
fortable reporting third party harassment because they believe their
employer cares about their dignity and respect.
Additionally, an employer may want to perform an audit of the
way in which it forms and conducts its relationships with third parties.
For example, as part of a law firm retainer or the admission papers to a
hospital, the employer may want to include a statement that it observes
all equal opportunity laws, and expects that clients or patients will treat
its employees with respect and refrain from any type of sexual harass-
ment. Or similarly, a restaurant could include a line or two on its menu:
"We treat you with respect. Please treat our waitstaff with courtesy and
respect.
The types of changes suggested above are not "rocket science." An
employer of goodwill and commonsense can easily implement many of
these suggestions without incurring significant costs or losses in produc-
tivity. The return in greater employee loyalty will also be a benefit of
instituting these policies.
CONCLUSION
Until I started working and thinking about this article, I had for-
gotten an incident that occurred to me when I was seventeen and
working at my first "real" job. It was the summer before I started col-
lege" and I was a receptionist at a local and sizeable printing press. That
morning, an ink salesman approached the front desk with his sample
case, hoping to see the lead pressman. After I told him there would be a
bit of a wait, he leaned across the counter to ask me my name, saying,
"You're new around here." After that, he began to make a number of
comments about my appearance, none of them welcome since, at the
very least, he was far older than I. His comments culminated in a par-
ticularly graphic invitation to lunch at his apartment. I looked up
through demure and lowered lashes, and declined the invitation, noting
that I was "jail bait." My only satisfaction in this encounter was his reac-
tion, as he dropped his sample case, recovered it, and went bustling off
in the direction of the presses.
413. For the historically particular, this would have been the summer of 1971.
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I never told anyone at work about this encounter. I did not think
they would believe me; I did not think that they would care."' I re-
membered being disgusted, and embarrassed. It was difficult to focus for
the rest of the day, and it made me somewhat apprehensive about han-
dling customers and salespeople in the future. I was captive behind that
desk. I had to be a "nice girl," no matter what. That evening at dinner, I
told my family, and was applauded for handling the incident well. My
father suggested I should have decked him, but I pointed out that I
would have lost my job. As I write this, I wonder how many women are
coming home to describe the same types of incidents to their family.
Women who have decided, resignedly, that this kind of treatment is
part of the job.
This article emphasizes how much the law matters, both when it
speaks and when it is silent. The law is part of the rhetoric that shapes
our sense of what is acceptable, and as an act of language can "at once
reveal and reshape the attitudes and value choices of our community.""'
The kind of social change suggested by this article is consistent with the
spirit, if not the letter, of Title VII: that law can act as a positive force
for changing behavior, and perhaps, ultimately, attitudes."' The expres-
414. Upon reflection, the only beneficial thing about the encounter was that "at least" this
man, who was white, was willing to harass someone across racial lines, which was rare
for the times.
415. O'Connor, supra note 382, at 1543.
416. Consider, for example, the words of the court in Ellison v. Brady:
'Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and
a sense of degradation which serve to close or discourage employment op-
portunities for women.' We hope that over time both men and women will
learn what conduct offends reasonable members of the other sex. When
employers and employees internalize the standard of workplace conduct we
establish today, the current gap in perception between the sexes will be
bridged.
924 F.2d at 880 (citation omitted) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469, 1483 (3rd Cir. 1990). Abrams also states that:
[F]ormal equality does not always herald a change in attitudes.... Those
declaring early victory for working women have mistaken the nature and
scope of the enterprise. It is not the challenge of opening doors, but the
more complex and elusive task of opening minds that will secure for
women the experience, as well as the forms, of gender equality.
Abrams, supra note 262, at 1247-48. Without belaboring the point, there is a long
tradition of debate between those who think that law changes only behavior, and
those who think it can ultimately change attitude. Obviously, I fall into the latter
camp. Thus for me, law is "in no small part, a chronicle of formerly acceptable out-
THE CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS RIGHT
sion of women's experience, detailed in the first part of this article, is a
predicate for any type of legal or social change. Even in the few cases
that addressed third party harassment, counsel and the courts apparently
spent little time trying to document whether third party harassment was
a problem of such magnitude that it deserved some type of treatment by
the court. Although there is clearly a need for further empirical work in
this area, the material presented here documents the need for legal
treatment of this issue. A recognized legal remedy will raise public
awareness of the dignitary interests of workers as well as raise the cost of
ignoring those interests as it presents individual redress to victims of
actionable third party harassment.
By locating sexual harassment, whether by third parties, supervi-
sors, or co-workers, in debates about dignity, and workplace health and
safety in addition to the feminist venue, we will have a broader base for
understanding the way in which third party harassment affects us all,
both within our lives with organizations and in the broader social and
political community. This article has sought not only to identify a dif-
ferent form of sexual harassment and extend the definition of actionable
conduct in the legal arena, but also to suggest that this is not just a
problem for women, but a problem for all of us. It reflects on the kind
of civil dignity and respect that we are willing to accord one another as
we go about our work.4 17 In the long run, it might lead to a civic culture
in which any kind of abuse or harassment, for whatever reason, would
be inappropriate." '
rages." Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Men Behaving Badly, NEW YORKER Aug. 18, 1997, at
4 (quoting a sentence that originally began with the phrase, "History is .... )
417. The endpoint of this analysis is a unified theory and treatment of all workplace har-
assment on whatever basis: race, sex, religion, disability, sexual preference, age, color
and national origin. The EEOC's rescinded proposed guidelines suggested such an
approach, and they are endorsed here.
See also, Frank S. Ravitch, Contextualizing Gender Harassment: Providing an
Analytical Framework for an Emerging Concept in Discrimination Law, 1995 U. DET.
COLL. L. MICH. ST. L. REv. 853, 882 (After comparing a number of harassment
cases, he comments: "[O]ne can see the similarity in the types of conduct alleged in
gender, racial, religious, and national origin harassment. The conduct is not based on
any attraction or sexual need, but rather upon hatred or disapproval of an individual
or individuals because of membership in a protected class.").
418. Literary and social critic Henry Louis Gates takes us to task for forgetting that the
word "sex" in sexual harassment did not limit this action to abuse which arose out of
the abusive use of sexuality, but rather was meant to cover harassment of any form
directed at a woman, on account of her sex, in order to impede her performance at
the workplace. As a result of this confusion about the word "sexual," he argues,
correctly I think, that we have made this doctrine a litmus test for inappropriate
displays of sexuality as opposed to its correct role in attacking abuse or harassment
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People who know of the San Diego Zoo and Wild Animal Park are
probably familiar with this sign, which is posted about the zoo and sold
as a souvenir: "PLEASE DO NOT annoy, torment, pester, plague, mo-
lest, worry, badger, harry, harass, heckle, persecute, irk, bully rag, vex,
disquiet, grate, beset, bother, tease, nettle, tantalize or ruffle the ani-
mals."
The question this article asks is why do the animals at the zoo get
more protection from unwelcome harassment than the people at the
souvenir stands and food booths? Isn't it time for a change? t
that impede's women's opportunities in the workplace. Gates, supra note 416, at 5.
Again, this also aids the argument that our long term goal is to end abuse in the
workplace and the tyranny of the "Boss from Hell." It is a misuse and distortion of
doctrine to use Title VII to target bad bosses, and that's another article beyond the
scope of this one.
